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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1994, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (hereinafter
"NCAA") agreed to a lucrative television contract with CBS, valued at
$1,750,000,000 over an 8-year period.'
This contract provided over
$200,000,000 per year in revenue to the NCAA, essentially for the right to televise the Division I-A men's basketball tournament. 2 This agreement demonstrated the entertainment value of men's intercollegiate basketball at its highest
level. In 1999, the NCAA and CBS entered into a new contract. Under this
contract, the NCAA will receive over $6,000,000,000, $500,000,000 per year
for the right to televise the association's men's basketball championship tournament over the 11-year period from 2002-2013. 3 Thus, within five years, the
NCAA had entered into a contract that more than doubled the annual payment
that it was to receive for the television rights to the tournament which will result in approximately $250,000,000 in new income on an annual basis.
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Other NCAA events were included, but their inclusion did not add significantly, if at all, to
the value of the contract. It was clear that CBS was primarily bargaining for the right to
televise "March Madness," the Division I-A men's basketball tournament.
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The economic value of big-time 4 intercollegiate athletics is evidenced in
other ways, as well. A recent report indicated that 74% of Division I-A men's
basketball teams made an average of over $2,000,000 in profits and 71% of Division I-A men's football teams showed average profits of over $5,000,000 per
year. 5 It is clear that "big-time" intercollegiate athletics is often very profitable. Other men's and women's sports at all levels typically are not profitable.6
Indeed, it is clear that funds generated by profitable Division I-A men's basketball and football programs are being diverted to cover expenses generated by
nonrevenue-producing programs.
Approximately forty-five percent (45%) of the student-athletes in men's
football at the Division I-A level are African-American, 7 and more than sixty
percent (60%) of student-athletes in Division I-A men's basketball are AfricanAmerican. The number of African-Americans and persons of color in other
sports programs, on the other hand, is minimal . Thus, it is evident that profits
generated in significant measure by African-American male athletes are being
diverted to fund non-revenue producing sports played largely by white studentathletes. Arguably, this diversion of funds constitutes exploitation of male athletes of color in men's basketball and football. 9
Given the profitability of men's basketball and football, at the Division I-A
level, and the fact that this profit is generated in significant measure by the efforts on the court and field by athletes of color, a number of commentators have
argued that athletes at this level should be paid for their efforts and entertainment value. 10 These recommendations range from proposals calling for the
professionalization of intercollegiate men's basketball and football at the Divi4 "Big-time" intercollegiate athletics, as used in this article, refers to the major revenue-

producing sports of men's basketball and football, at the Division I level in men's basketball
and the Division I-A level in men's football.
5
Survey Shows Increasein Deficits, THE NCAA NEWS (October 12, 1998)
<http://www.ncaa.org/news/19981012/active/3534n01 .html> [hereinafter Deficit Survey].
6 For example, it has been noted that, "Twenty Division I respondents made money on their
women's basketball program. Only two of those were in Division I-A, although the average
figure was substantial ($274,000)." Id. That same article, however, showed that "financial
deficits for intercollegiate programs are growing at an increasing rate." Id. "The deficit [expenses over revenues] grew from $237,000 in 1995, when the last study was made, to
$823,000 in 1997." Id. What this survey shows, but refrains from drawing attention to, is
the fact that men's basketball and football, at the Division I-A level, are the only truly profitable sports. Thus, the profits from those sports are being used to fund other non-revenue
producing sports as the overall cost of intercollegiate athletics increases.
7 Perry A. Zirkel, Standardsfor African-American Athletes Will PerpetuateAcademic Racism in Big-Time Sports, KNIGHT-RIDDER NEWSPAPERS, March 13, 1998.
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., Rodney K. Smith, When Ignorance is Not Bliss: In Search of Racial and Gender
Equity in IntercollegiateAthletics, 61 Mo. L. REV.329, 347-352 (1996).
10See, e.g., Michael P. Acain, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Curefor the Exploitation of College Athletes, 18 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 307 (1998) [hereinafter "Acain"]; and Allen L. Sack &
Ellen J.Staurowsky, College Athletes for Hire: The Evolution and Legacy of the NCAA 's
Amateurism Myth (Praeger 1998) [hereinafter "Sack & Staurowsky"].
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sion I-A level, with direct and potentially lucrative payments to top athletes,''
to less dramatic efforts to pay student-athletes at this level with more modest
stipends, while retaining grants-in-aid. 12 Even NCAA officials have considered
using a portion of the additional dollars generated by the new CBS contract to
televise the men's basketball tournament for stipends to supplement the current
grants received by student-athletes at this level.
The NCAA's primary argument, however, is that, by providing academic
scholarships for student-athletes, they are providing them with a very valuable
resource - educational opportunity. Serious questions have arisen, however, regarding whether the NCAA and its member institutions are keeping their part
of the bargain with student-athletes in revenue-producing programs.' 3 Indeed,
a recent commentator has argued that the agreement between the NCAA's
member institutions and their "big-time" athletes may well be unconscionable.14 Graduation rates, a strong indicator of how much educational opportunity is actually being received by these student-athletes, are extremely disappointing and seem to add fodder to the argument that student-athletes in men's
basketball and football at the Division I-A level are not receiving the benefit of
their bargain, in terms of actual educational opportunity. Low graduation rates,
based on the NCAA's own tracking of graduation by student-athletes, based on
graduation rates within six years of initial enrollment by the student-athlete,
even though athletes are typically given just four or five years of scholarship
assistance, are disquieting. Overall graduation rates for the class of freshmen
entering in 1992 indicate that only fifty-one percent (51%) of Division I-A
football players graduated, with only forty-one percent (41%) of Division I basketball players graduating.15 These figures become even more disturbing when
it is noted that only thirty-three percent (33%) of African-American male athletes playing Division I-A men's basketball and thirty-seven percent (37%) of
Division I-A football players graduated, figures that have sadly been dropping. 16 Whatever the cause, it is clear that the NCAA and its member institutions are not, in fact, providing the kind of educational opportunity that would
clearly justify concluding that these athletes are being well compensated for
their efforts.
This article will explore two questions: 1) Whether "big-time" intercollegiate student-athletes are being treated inequitably; and 2) If there has been in' Id.

12 See,

e.g., C. Peter Gopelrud III, Payfor Playfor College Athletes: Now, More Than Ever,

38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1081 (1997) [hereinafter "Gopelrud"]. The NCAA refers to its financial
aid or scholarships for student-athletes as grants-in-aid.

13See, e.g., Timothy Davis, College Athletics: Testing the Boundaries of Contractand Tort

Law, 29 U.C. DAVIS LAw REV. 971 (1996).
14 Timothy Davis, An Unconscionability Analysis of the Student-Athlete/University Relationship (paper presented August 15, 2000 at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association) [hereinafter Davis, Unconscionability'".
15"1999 Graduation-Rates Summary," cited in www.ncaa.org.
161id.
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equitable treatment of student-athletes in Division I revenue-producing programs, what should be done about it? As to the second question, this article will
examine models that have been proffered for compensating intercollegiate athletes at this level, critique those models, and offer a new model that seeks to
balance the educational objectives of the NCAA and its member institutions
with the need to provide meaningful compensation to those student-athletes,
including in particular African-American student-athletes, who generate the
substantial profits in Division I-A men's basketball and football.
II. ECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUITY

Much has been written about economic and educational inequity in the
treatment of male athletes, particularly athletes of color, in the revenueproducing sports of Division I men's basketball and Division I-A football.' 7 It
is not necessary to rehash all that has been written on this topic. Indeed, it will
suffice to demonstrate that a strong case has been made for economic and educational inequity in the treatment of these student-athletes.
A. Economic Inequity

The NCAA and its member institutions often complain that they are losing
money in operating their intercollegiate athletics programs.18 Cedric W.
Dempsey, the NCAA's President, has emphasized that "[t]he popular myth is
that college athletic programs make profits. The fact is that only 78 out of
1,000 programs generate more revenues than they spend." 19 While essentially
accurate on its face, this statement tells only part of the story.
It is true that most athletic programs, particularly at the Division II and III
levels, are not profitable. 20 At the Division III level, student-athletes are
awarded grants on a need or academic basis and are not awarded athletic
grants-in-aid. 2' Division II schools, where athletic grants are awarded, run average deficits evidenced by 1997 figures of $947,000 for programs with football and $773,000 for programs without men's football.22 While students often
attend Division II and III athletic events, those events are seldom televised and
are of little commercial appeal. Programs at that level simply do not demonstrate the capacity or entertainment value necessary to generate profits.
The picture at the Division I level is more complicated. The NCAA notes
17See, e.g., Sack & Staurowsky, supra note 10.
18See, e.g., Deficit Survey, supra note 5, which is intended to demonstrate an increase in
deficits for intercollegiate athletic program.
19Supra note 1, at A54.
20
Deficit Survey, supra note 5.
21Allen L. Sack & Ellen J. Staurowsky, A Rejoinder to Timothy Davis, IntercollegiateAthletics in the Next Millennium: A Frameworkfor Evaluating Proposals, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.
J.117, 120 (1999) [hereinafter Rejoinder].
22 Deficit Survey, supra note 5.
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that, "[tjhe deficit for the average Division I-A program grew from $237,000 in
1995 ... to $823,000 in 1997. ",23 It also points out that deficits at the Division
2
I-AA 24 level have risen from $1,700,000 in 1995 to $2,000,000 in 1997.25
While these figures appear to substantiate Director Dempsey's assertion that
profitability is a myth in intercollegiate athletics, one must look deeper to get a
full picture.
The figures cited above include all sports. Division I institutions have multiple programs for men and women. Rarely are any of these programs, other
than men's basketball and football, profitable. There are exceptions, such as an
occasional women's basketball program;2 6 but, as a general rule, the only programs that generate a profit are men's basketball and football.2 7 Profits generated by men's basketball and football are diverted to cover the expenses of nonrevenue programs. Even though profits from men's basketball and football
may be substantial, they are often dissipated in helping to keep other programs
operating. Those other programs offer athletic grants-in-aid, even though the
athletes in those sports are not generating revenue. Salaries for coaches, travel,
and operational and maintenance expenses in those programs cause overall expenses to mount. Thus, even though profits from men's basketball and football
programs at the Division I level may be substantial, they are often consumed in
helping to finance nonrevenue-producing sports.
This situation is somewhat analogous to a major corporation with two primary profit centers or subsidiaries. In that sense, the corporation might report a
loss as a whole, but it would not lose sight of the profitability of its profit centers. Indeed, it would do what it could to ensure the profitability of those centers, while dealing with the problem of continuing losses in other areas. Pressure to maintain other nonrevenue men's programs, coupled with demands for
equity in women's programs under Title IX, has made it very difficult for the
NCAA and its member institutions to minimize losses in other areas. This
places considerable pressure on the profit centers to maintain the profitability
or at least minimize the losses of the entire athletics program at an institution.
Additionally, funds generated by the profit centers also are used to maintain the
NCAA itself.
This already complicated picture is rendered all the more difficult by problems related to determining the actual profitability to a Division I-A institution
of its men's basketball and football programs. Certainly, one can examine general profits at the institutional level. The primary source of revenue for an
institution, according to the NCAA, is in the form of ticket sales. 28 Those
ticket sales purportedly account for twenty-eight percent (28%) of the revenue,
23 Id.
24 Division I-AA includes programs that have a Division I men's basketball program, but do
not
25 have men's football programs at that level. Id.
26
27
28

Deficit Survey, supra note 5.
Id.and accompanying text.
1d.
1d.

Spring 2001 ]

PROMISES TO STUDENT ATHLETES

sales purportedly account for twenty-eight percent (28%) of the revenue, while
at levels other than Division I, the primary source of revenues is student fees.29
There are other significant areas of revenue production, however, that are not
included in the NCAA's survey, from which it concludes that only a small percentage of programs are profitable.
Television and related contracts, including sales of materials with the institution's logo, are often not included in the institution's calculations of revenue.
For example, President Dempsey of the NCAA reports that, in 1999 "[t]here
will be $151-million [of television and related revenue] distributed to Division
I members to help support opportunities for student-athletes." 3° As much as
$100-million in additional funds may be generated by the tournament, under
the existing television agreement, 31 and other marketing income, for the conferences and institutions participating in the tournament and the NCAA. It is difficult to determine profits generated from this latter source since it is unclear
under current accounting practices how to distinguish tournament revenue from
market-related revenue. It is, however, conservative to assume that those revenues may run into the millions of dollars, given the advertising value of the
tournament itself. Revenues from ticket sales and concessions are also substantial. These funds may not find their way into calculations of a program's
profitability at an individual institution.
One should also note that of the $151,000,000 President Dempsey claims
will be distributed to benefit student-athletes, a substantial portion of those dollars are diverted to fund the conferences to which institutions belong. Additionally, a substantial portion of the operational costs of the NCAA itself are
generated by the tournament, but never find their way into a calculation of income at the institutional level. Certainly, NCAA and conference expenses can
be said to "help support opportunities for student-athletes," but those figures
may not find their way into calculations of actual profits generated by the tournament. The same can be said about television and related revenues generated
from football bowl games. Some of it finds its way into income calculations at
the institutional level, but a portion of it goes to the conference and for other
purposes. Thus, accounting for the true income generated by Division I men's
basketball and football requires a determination of actual revenues generated
from all sources. It is important, as well, to examine the source of all expenses
generated by entities other than the institution.
To complicate matters further, institutions do not account for the less tangible value generated by the commercially and publicly appealing Division I
men's basketball and football programs. It has been observed that institutions
with successful men's basketball and football programs experience an increase
29

30

id.
Supra note 1.

Television revenues, under the current contract with CBS, exceed $215 million. Debra E.
Blum, Athletic Notes, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, May 19, 1995, at A41.
31
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in applications to the institution. 32 This increase in applications and media attention for the institution is a clear benefit, economically and otherwise, but it
never finds its way into determinations of the income generated by the men's
basketball and football programs.
It is clear, therefore, that income figures are deflated in significant ways.
Nevertheless, they are substantial. As previously noted,33 even with figures
that do not reflect the full profitability of men's basketball and football programs, seventy-four percent (74%) of Division I-A men's basketball programs
made an average of $2,200,000 of revenues over expenses in 1997, with seventy-one percent (71%) of Division I-A men's football programs making an
average of approximately $5,000,000 in 1997. Many Division I-A football and
basketball programs make a substantial profit, despite the fact that figures reported do not include all sources of income.
Institutions have essentially acknowledged the potential profitability of Division I-A men's basketball and football. Salaries for coaches are the largest
single expense at the Division I-A level, whereas grants-in-aid (scholarships for
student-athletes) are the major expense at all other levels. 34 Head coaches in
Division I-A men's basketball and football are often paid more than $1,000,000
per year in personal income from all sources.35 Assistant coaches at the Division I-A also receive substantial salaries, often exceeding salaries paid to head
coaches in Divisions II and III. Institutions also generally pay substantially
higher salaries for coaches and athletics administrators associated with Division
I-A men's basketball and football programs, in further recognition of the profitability or potential profitability of those programs. In short, they do what any
corporation would do. They pay their executives according to profitability or
potential profitability of a given enterprise.
Courts have upheld this differential in pay for men's coaches against Title
IX claims of gender discrimination on the part of coaches of women's programs at the same level, essentially on the ground that there is a different market for revenue-producing programs. 36 Institutions and courts alike, therefore,
have recognized the special market and profit potential of Division I-A men's
basketball and football. Unfortunately, this recognition of the special market
niche of men's basketball and football at the "big-time" level has not resulted
in greater benefits for the student-athletes who play a major role in generating
32Timothy Davis, IntercollegiateAthletics: Competing Models and ConflictingRealities, 25

RUTGERS L.J. 269, 296 (1994) (citing Mark R. Whitmore, Denying Scholarship Athletes
Worker's Compensation: Do Courts Punt Away a Statutory Right?, 76 IOWA L. REv. 763,
782
(1991)).
33
Deficit Survey, supra note 5.

34 Id.

35 Rob Remis, Analysis of Civil and CriminalPenalties in Athletic Agent Statutes and Sup-

port for the Imposition of Civil and Criminal Liability Upon Athletes, 8 SETON HALL J.
SPORT LAW 1, 55-56 (1998).

36See discussion of Stanley case and related matters, infra at note 212, and accompanying
text.
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these revenues.
Given that student-athletes at this level do not share in the revenues generated by "big-time" men's basketball and football in the same unique manner as
the NCAA, conferences, institutions, coaches and administrators, it is not surprising that claims of exploitation and inequitable treatment have arisen. Student-athletes at this level, who are primarily athletes of color, have a strong argument that they are not receiving an equitable share of the wealth they
contribute to generating. They have no union or other means of arguing their
case or bargaining to ensure fair compensation and are left to rely on the good
will of others who are more powerful.
B. Academic Inequity

The major inducement for a prospective athlete in Division I-A men's basketball and football, other than being given the opportunity to showcase his talents, is educational in nature. In exchange for coming to an institution and participating in its men's basketball or football program, the athlete receives a
grant-in-aid to attend the institution. This grant-in-aid typically includes tuition
and fees, room, board and books. This grant, which represents an opportunity
to obtain an education, is a major inducement to the athlete to attend the institution and participate in intercollegiate athletics.
Graduation rates for student-athletes at this level indicate that, for many
athletes, particularly athletes of color, this inducement is more imagined than
real. For example, in men's basketball at the Division I level, only forty-one
percent (41%) of the male athletes graduated within six years, while the overall
graduation rate for male students at those same institutions for the same time
period was fifty-four percent (54%).37 In Division I-A football, fifty-one percent (51%) of the athletes graduated, as compared to fifty-eight percent (58%)
of males in the general student body at the same institutions. 38 The figures are
even more glaring for African-American athletes. In men's Division I basketball only thirty-three percent (33%) graduated, as compared to fifty-four percent (54%) of the male students at the same institutions. 39 In Division I-A
football, 42 percent (42%) of the black student-athletes graduated, as compared
to fifty-eight percent (58%) of male students at those institutions. 40 These
graduation rates have remained fairly constant over the past decade. 4' Studentathletes in "big-time" men's football and basketball are not graduating at the
same rate as their male counterparts in the student body, lending some credence
37 Deficit Survey, supra note 5.
38

id.

39 Id. It is worth noting, however, that the 33% graduation rate among black athletes compares more favorably to the 31% graduation rates for black males in the same institutions
over the same six year time period.
40 id.
41 id.
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to the argument that they are not receiving a genuine educational opportunity in
exchange for their participation in intercollegiate athletics.
It might be argued that this is understandable, given that these athletes may
not be interested in converting their educational opportunity into a degree.
Simply, they may be more interested in pursuing their athletic career than in
furthering their education. This speculation, which may itself carry with it a
hint of racism, is undercut in two ways. First, a more plausible explanation
may be that the coaches in men's basketball and football at this level demand
more of them, in terms of time and energy, than athletes in other programs.
While this assertion is speculative because there is little empirical data available in this important area, it makes sense that coaches at this level, who are
better paid and are under extreme pressure to win because profits are tied to
winning programs, demand more of their players, in order to retain their position, salary and benefits. Student-athletes in major programs spend long hours
studying playbooks, practicing, and training. They have to do so to be competitive since competitiveness translates into dollars for institutions, conferences,
and the NCAA.
Second, a recent study by the National Center for Public Policy and Higher
Education undercuts the sometimes implied notion that athletes of color,4 2 who
predominate in these revenue-producing programs, care less about education
than their counterparts in the general student-body. That study found that most
Americans believe that a college degree is necessary for success, but AfricanAmerican and Hispanic parents place an even higher value on the degree than
do white parents. 43 Of course, the attitude of athletes of color in big-time sports
may not be easily translatable to this study of parental attitudes, but the study
nevertheless seems to undercut the assertion of lack of interest in a degree on
the part of these student-athletes.
Given the lack of data and empirical study that has been done on these issues, and because the NCAA, conferences and institutions have far more resources to determine the causes of the failure of student-athletes to graduate at
a higher rate, the burden should be on them, and not the athletes, to demonstrate that the athletes simply do not want to take advantage of the educational
opportunity they are purportedly being given. Even if there were such a study
supporting the thesis that student-athletes at this level do not desire a degree,
the educationally-related institutions that reap substantial benefit from the athletes should be expected to break down such cultural barriers.
While it is more difficult to demonstrate that the institutions, through demands of their coaches, and otherwise, are engaging in some form of educaFor obvious reasons, related to thinly veiled racism, this argument is seldom written, but
the authors have heard it with enough regularity to have to reluctantly note it.
43 John Immerwahr and Tony Folero, How the Public and Parents - White, African Ameri42

can and Hispanic - View Higher Education, National Center for Public Policy and Higher

Education, National Center for Postsecondary
Improvement
<http://www.highereducation.org/reports/expectations.shtml>.
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tional fraud or exploitation, a sufficient case can be made for the proposition
that the burden has clearly shifted to the institutions to prove that they have
done all within their power to ensure that educational benefits are in fact received by these student-athletes and claims of inequity are unfounded. In not
doing so, they are essentially recognizing that Division I-A men's basketball
and football may have little educational purpose, at least insofar as actual compensation of the athletes is concerned. If this is true, then arguments for compensating student-athletes as professionals of a sort would seem to have more
merit. Therefore, we will examine the various models of compensation that
have been proffered.
III. MODELS OF COMPENSATION

There have been a number of models that have been suggested as means of
compensating student-athletes in Division I-A men's football and basketball, in
response to concerns regarding inequitable treatment of student-athletes at that
level. These various models are largely of four types: (1) revenue-sharing; (2)
instituting a professional division within the intercollegiate system; (3) a scholarship plus stipend approach; and (4) the reform approach taken by the NCAA.
A. Revenue-Sharing
The concept of revenue-sharing was substantially developed by Michael P.
Acain. 44 Revenue-sharing centers on the idea that universities receive enormous financial benefits from their student-athletes and ought to share that revenue with those who produce it.45 However, because NCAA rules prohibit stu46
dent-athletes from receiving compensation for their athletic performance,
other than in the form of grants-in-aid or scholarships, these student-athletes do
of the profits they are critically involved in
not receive a fair proportion
47
producing for their schools.
Acain asserts that the NCAA's grant-in-aid and allowance of studentathletes to hold part-time jobs is only an "illusion of compensation," and that in
reality, the compensation that is given is insufficient. 48 Acain emphasizes that
permitting an athlete to hold part-time employment will cover the costs of attending a university, but it does not take into consideration the personal and
travel costs sustained by the athlete. 49 Acain believes that, while universities
have reaped significant revenue from the labors of their athletes at this level,
the athletes have been treated unfairly. 50 Through implementation of a "reve44Acain, supra note 10.
45Id.
46

Infra note 53, and accompanying text.
47Acain, supra note 10.
48 Id. at 335-36.
49

5

1d. at 316.

°Id.at 336.
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nue-sharing plan between student-athletes and the colleges ...those athlete
[will receive] the compensation they deserve. 51
In order for a revenue-sharing plan to be implemented, allowing student
athletes to receive a portion of the revenues generated from their athletic participation, Acain stresses that the NCAA would need to amend NCAA Constitution § 12.02.2.
Additionally, NCAA Rule 15.2 would need alteration for
the revenue sharing plan to work, and Rule 12.1.1 would have to be changed in
order to implement the various forms of compensation to the student-athletes
recommended by the Acain Plan ("the Plan").53 The Plan also considers the
costs of each sport, and concentrates on sharing the net profits. 54 If, for example, a team did not net any profit in any particular year, the student athlete
would be forced to "rely on their scholarship as their sole means of compensation., 55 The Plan would also implement a "seniority-based system," which
provides student-athletes with compensation for
longevity, loyalty, and contin56
programs.
respective
their
to
ued contribution
The revenue plan would permit student athletes to receive a percentage of
the school's revenue earned by the athlete's particular team.57 The revenues
would be divided so fourth-year athletes would receive 1% of all revenues generated by their sport that year; third-year athletes would receive .75 % of the
net revenues earned by their sport in the particular year; second year athletes
would receive .50% of the net revenues, and first year athletes would receive
.25% of the net revenues. 58 The remaining earnings received by the sport could
then be distributed for various expenses at the discretion of the athletic department. 59 Additional revenue could be distributed to the athletes for the awards
or payments that are given to teams for their participation in post-season competition.
Generally speaking, the payments are given to the conferences and
then divided up among the members of the conference. 6 1 The individual
amounts that each of the schools still receive is a substantial sum.6 2 Acain suggests that a 65% distribution to the school and 35 % distribution to the athletes
of the post-season net revenues would be sufficient compensation and reward
for their post-season play. 63 Acain further suggests that, while revenues during
the season are distributed based on a seniority type of system, the revenues re51 id.
52 id.

3Id. at 336-37.
54 Id.at 337.
55id.
56

id.

57id.
58 Id.at
59Id.
60°Id.

338

61 id.
62

63

Id.
Id. at 338-39.
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ceived from post-season play in tournaments should be distributed based on the
64
individual performance of the particular athlete during the post-season play.
Acain believes that because not every team can make it to a playoff, the revenue sharing system during the post-season should be based on those that contribute to the team's success, regardless of how many years they have been at
the university. 65 For the profits earned by a team for their post-season performance, Acain suggests that 50% of the revenues should go to the starting players,
35% should go to the key reserves that come
66 off of the bench, and 15% should
team.
the
of
members
remaining
the
to
go
Student-athletes could also be compensated by increasing the amount of
money that accompanies academic and athletic All-American awards.67 At the
present time, the NCAA has limited the amounts of these awards to $300.68
Under the proposed revenue-sharing theory, athletes would receive compensation in excess of the current $300 limit for their academic and athletic excellence. 69 For example, Acain asserts that the NCAA could start its own annual
7
athletic All-American team funded by newspaper and magazine sponsors. 0
Acain also considers the academic All-American teams. 7 1 Every year,
GTE honors approximately 700 student-athletes for their performance in the
classroom as well as their athletic performance. 72 Acain suggests that under the
revenue-sharing plan, money for these awards could be generated by a $1,500
donation by each school that is a member of the NCAA.73 Thus, with the more
than 1,000 member institutions, $1.5 million of the requisite $1.75 million (this
comes to $2,500 per athlete) for these awards could be produced by the
schools, with the remaining $250,000 donated by some other source. 74 Those
athletes that qualify for both the athletic All-American and academic AllAmerican teams should be compensated double the amount for their excellent
achievements. 75 The revenue-sharing plan would provide the money for these
bonus earnings either through the individual schools, the NCAA, or through
private forms of donation. 76 Due to the ever-increasing popularity of college

64
65

Id. at 339.
Id.

66Id.
67

68

id.
Id. (citing the NCAA DIVISION I

69

Id.

70

Id. at 340

71id.
72

MANUAL,

Id.(citing to GTE Homepage,

Art. 16.1.4.2.1.)

GTE Academic All-America Teams Program

<http://www.gte.com>. "Students must be a sophomore, have at least a 3.20 GPA, and
be a starter or key backup player on their team." Id.)
73Id. at 340-41.

Id.
Id. at 341.
76 Id.
74

75

NEVADA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1 :160

sports, merchandise and paraphernalia, profits are booming. 77 Student-athletes
who are the primary contributors to the merchandise's popularity, however, do
not share directly in any of the revenues that the schools receive. 78 Acain argues that student-athletes should receive a percentage of the merchandise and
revenue endorsements they are responsible for generating. 79 The revenue sharing for endorsements might occur in any of three different ways: (1) the universities could decide, through some form of license agreement, to divide a portion
of the revenues with the student athletes by, for example, giving 35% of the
revenues generated to the athletic department which in turn would distribute the
earnings among the student-athletes; (2) where name brands pay schools to put
their logos on the uniforms, schools could share a percentage of those profits
with the student athletes; and (3), the NCAA could allow student-athletes to
participate in endorsement contracts, and keep 80% (Acain uses this percentage
for simplicity) of the revenues they earn from endorsements.
Acain's Plan
certainly endeavors to address issues of economic exploitation and inequity in
the compensation of "big-time" student-athletes. While some attention is given
to providing compensation to academic All-Americans, the Plan does not otherwise address issues of educational inequity. Acain is to be commended for
his detailed effort to address the economic inequity issues so as to ensure that
student-athletes are equitably compensated for their efforts.
However, there are problems with the Acain Plan. Professor Timothy
Davis has developed a framework for evaluating reform proposals like the
Acain Plan. Professor Davis evaluates such proposals on three bases: 1) their
impact on the education value; 2) their social implications; and 3) practical
problems associated with implementing the proposals.82 These three bases provide a helpful framework for evaluating the Acain Plan and similar reform proposals. Institutions of higher education were formed for the very purpose of
furthering academic values. The NCAA ascribes to this value, as well, when it
describes its basic purpose as follows:
The competitive athletics programs of member institutions are designed to
be a vital part of the educational system. A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the student-athlete as an integral part of the student
body. By so doing, it provides a clear line83 of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.
77

1d.

78 Id. (citing Vladimir P. Belo, The Shirts off Their Backs: Colleges Getting Away with Violatingthe Right of Publicity, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133 (1996)).
79 Id.
80

Id. at 342
81Timothy Davis, IntercollegiateAthletics in the Next Millenium: A Frameworkfor Evaluating Reform Proposals,9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 253 (1999) [hereinafter Framework].
82
Id. at 262-271.
83 1999-2000 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, Article 1.3.1.
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The Acain Plan does not address academic values. Instead, the revenuesharing it proposes directly conflicts with the purposes of the NCAA, as Acain
appears to recognize. 84 On one level, therefore, it would seem to be inappropriate to evaluate Acain's Plan on that ground, because it merely addresses economic and not educational inequity. There are two ways, nevertheless, in
which the failure to address the impact of his Plan on educational values constitute a legitimate, and telling, critique of the Acain Plan. First, Timothy Davis
notes that "[u]nder a professional model, institutions will be more likely to
abandon any sense of obligation to provide student-athletes with a meaningful
educational opportunity." ' 5 Professor Davis adds that "[t]he racial composition
of the revenue-producing sports, concomitant with the likelihood that only the
revenue-producing sports would become professionalized, means that the imwill be disproportionately felt by Africanpact of the professional model
86
American student-athletes."
Davis then questions the extent to which "the underlying premises of the
professional model rely on and feed into untrue stereotypes of African American student-athletes' intellectual acumen and desire to seek educational pursuits. ''87 Therefore, at a minimum, Acain and other advocates of a revenuesharing model must respond to claims that their potential diminution of the
academic value is unwarranted and constitutes greater cost to the athlete than
the benefits accrued by the athlete under their respective models. The proponents of a revenue-sharing model also fail to address serious questions of academic inequity of the type raised earlier in this article, which may constitute
another form of taking advantage of these athletes.88
There are also economic reasons for considering the academic value and
these considerations provide a second basis for criticizing the Acain and related
89
proposals, based on academic values. As demonstrated in this article, the
economic value of a college education, as evidenced by a degree, is well in excess of $500,000, in current dollars, over the working lifetime of the studentathlete, who graduates with a degree, as compared to the athlete who does not
receive such a degree. 90 It is highly unlikely that Acain's Plan would provide
income at that level for each athlete. Thus, the economic value emphasized by
Acain's Plan is less than the value of an education, even in a very tangible

sense.
Professor Davis also states that proposals should be evaluated based on
their social impact on the student-athletes. In this regard, Davis asserts that:
Athletes who participate in the professional division are more likely to feel isolated
Acain, supra note 10, and accompanying text.
85 Davis, Framework,supra note 81, at 267.
86 Id.
87 Id.
84

88
89

See supra notes 37-43, and accompanying text.
See infra note 181, and accompanying text.

90 Id.
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from an institution's academic and social mainstream .... Issues of stigma are
likely to become more prevalent. Will athletes be individuals who feel that they
occupy a legitimate place as students' on college campuses? In particular, will African-American student-athletes become even more isolated and stigmatized on
college campuses and suffer the consequences that ensue therefrom? 9'

Athletes, under the Acain Plan, are even more likely to suffer from the social stigma that already exists for many student-athletes, especially AfricanAmerican athletes, on campus. The sense that they are not really students, even
that they may be "dumb jocks" 92 or "gladiators" paid merely to entertain the
student body and others, 93 is likely to be increased under a model like Acain's,
that emphasizes revenue-sharing and not education.
Professor Davis also suggests that reform proposals be evaluated on practical grounds, emphasizing legal and structural issues.9 4 As Davis notes, "courts
have not been nearly as hesitant to become involved in issues involving the
business function of universities." 95 Under a revenue-sharing plan, like
Acain's, which emphasizes the business aspects of "big-time" intercollegiate
athletics, it is likely, as Davis notes, that legal issues will be raised in the following areas: "antitrust issues relating to the determination of salaries of student-athletes, athlete entitlement to worker's compensation given their employee status, labor issues such as the applicability of the National Labor
Relations Act, gender equity issues, and taxation issues relating to the tax status
of both the compensation paid to athletes and of the revenues generated by the
professional team." 96 It is also doubtful that contributions by graduates and
friends of the University to the athletic program envisioned by Acain would be
deductible for tax purposes. If issues arise in these and related legal areas, and
itis likely that they will under a model like Acain's, they will carry with them
significant legal and transaction costs.9 7 Time and energy of athletes and administrators will have to be directed to dealing with such issues, and diverted
from educational purposes. Accounting costs will increased under Acain's
Plan, because it raises complex accounting issues. For example, determining
net profit, which is to be shared, is no simple task, given that revenue generated
comes in many forms, ranging from gate receipts to television revenues. Acain
seems to recognize this in the area of marketing revenues, for the use of univer91Davis, Framework,supra note 81, at 268.
92 See id. at 265.

93Professor Harry Edwards has bemoaned the fact that the day may have arrived when "bigtime" student-athletes have achieved the status of gladiators. Id. at 268.
14Id. at 269-71.
95

Id. at 269.

96 Id.

97In addition to economic costs that may be reflected in responding to a judgment, there are
transaction costs, even in unsuccessful legal actions. Legal recourse invariably entails emotional and economic costs, for example in terms of lost hours of work expended in defending
against the lawsuit. These and related costs are transaction costs - costs attributable to responding to a legal action.
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sity logos, etc. It will be difficult to determine what is to be shared, and those
difficulties will lead to accounting and ultimately legal disputes.
Davis also discusses the practical implications of structural issues that necessarily arise under models like Acain's. 98 Since a new status is being created,
new rules will have to be promulgated to deal with institutions in that status, in
order to maintain a level playing field. 99 All the professionalization models,
including Acain's, are essentially calling for a change in the paradigm of governance for intercollegiate athletics. The structural difficulties in any such
paradigmatic change cannot be discounted or dismissed.
Sharing revenues, as envisioned by Acain, runs a high risk of compromising academic values for institutions and student-athletes alike, increasing the
economic costs to and social stigma suffered by athletes, and suggests a change
in paradigm that could have serious hidden implications for all concerned.
Given these problems, Acain's Plan may ultimately raise the question of a need
to create a professional minor league, divorced from the educational enterprise,
given the manner in which such a proposal compromises academic values, or a
professional division in intercollegiate athletics that openly recognizes the special economic and non-academic nature of men's basketball and football at the
most competitive levels.
B. ProfessionalDivision Within the IntercollegiateSystem
Allen L. Sack and Ellen J. Staurowsky propose a model whereby a profesSack
sional division would be included within the intercollegiate system.'
and Staurowsky propose a two-tier system that they believe encourages and
portrays true amateurism, l0 l while allowing for some of the major athletic powers to participate in a "professional" league. The programs would be
02 selfsufficient and totally unrelated to basic university academic operations.'
The two-tiered system includes an amateur tier, very similar to the approaches taken by Division III teams, or the Ivy League, where scholarships
and financial aid are distributed based on need and academic merit.0 3 This
tier could, without compromise, adhere to academic values. Furthermore, as
9
'

ld. at 269-71.
99 Professor Davis lists six such issues. Id.
10o Rejoinder, supra note 21, at 120. (For a complete discussion and analysis of Sack and
Staurowsky's theory, see Allen L. Sack & Ellen J. Staurowsky, College Athletes For Hire:
The Evolution and Legacy of the NCAA L%Amateur Myth (1998)).
101Sack and Staurowsky are strong proponents of an amateurism model, but they also acknowledge that it is unlikely that institutions with big-time programs will revert to an amateurism model. As such, they somewhat reluctantly offer their dual-tier model, which accepts and tries to address the need to compensate athletes at the "big-time" level. They
correctly note, as well, that the NCAA itself is involved in compensating student-athletes
and propose a system that they believe better accommodates academic values and economic
equity. See Sack & Staurowsky, supra note 10.
102

Id.

103 Id.
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Sack and Staurowsky emphasize, 104 this tier would be truly amateur in nature
and would enable institutions participating in that tier to claim "amateurism" as
a value.
The second tier involves a professional model, or a league where major
sport programs compete as entities separate from the university's academic
mission and operations. 1°5 Under Sack and Staurowsky's professional model,
the athletes receive room, board, and one year of college tuition paid for every
year the athlete played in the professional college sports league.' °6 Furthermore, under this proposed professional model, the athletes have up to ten years
from their initial entrance into the professional college league to take advantage
of the room, board, and tuition credits they earn while playing in the professional league.' °7 The athletes must satisfy the admissions requirements imposed on any entering student.' 0 8 While the athletes participate in the professional college league, they are not required to be simultaneously enrolled as
students at the particular institution. 10 9 Sack and Staurowsky argue that under
the current NCAA system, athletes, because of their scholarship contracts, are
required to put their sport as a top priority. 0 At the same time, however, in
the name of amateurism, the NCAA also requires that these student-athletes
carry a full-time student academic load."' Sack and Staurowsky believe that
their professional model resolves problems found in the current system in that it
would allow the athletes to obtain an education at a self-dictated pace. Their
professional model is also designed to deal with the extreme emotional and
physical demands of "big-time" intercollegiate athletics.' 2 Sack and
Staurowsky anticipate that this system would be particularly beneficial in providing an education to those with educationally inhibited backgrounds."13 Further, under their proposed professional college sports model, they state that athletes would be able to legally pursue many entrepreneurial avenues engaged in
by their coaches, such as endorsements, television contracts, speaking engagements, and money from sports agents." 4 Finally, Sack and Staurowsky believe
that athletes should receive some type of annual payment that is aligned with
the "financial realities of an open market."" ' 5
104 Id. In fact, Sack and Staurowsky's major purpose in writing their book was to promote
amateurism as a value in intercollegiate athletics and to stimulate a national dialogue regarding the importance of amateurism, as a matter of academic integrity. Id.

105
id.

'0'
Id.at 121.
107id.
108id.

109
Id.
11o Id.
111 Id.
112id.

113Id.
114

Id.at 122.

115id.
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Sack and Staurowsky's proposal is another effort to ensure that studentathletes are compensated equitably for their participation in revenue-producing
athletic programs. They also endeavor to deal with issues related to educational values. Their model is designed to compensate athletes for their athletic
performance, without compromising academic values at the institutional or individual level. The model is praiseworthy for its attempt to deal with both economic and academic inequities. As was the case with the Acain Plan, however,
there are problems when one examines the Sack and Staurowsky model in
greater depth.
Unlike the Acain Plan, the Sack and Staurowsky model is designed to preserve academic values. It does so by forming an amateur division, which is
closely tied to the academic institution and its values. At the same time, rather
than completely divorcing the professional division from academic institutions
and values, which would give rise to criticisms of the sort raised relative to the
Acain Plan, 116 Sack and Staurowsky provide student-athletes in the professional
division with grants-in-aid that may be used after their athletic careers have
ended. They argue that this will permit athletes to focus on their athletic job
until they have exhausted their eligibility, at which time they will have amassed
grant-in-aid credit that may be used to obtain an education, unencumbered by
the demands of participating as an athlete in a "big-time" program.
At first blush, this approach appears to maintain academic values by balancing the demands of athletics with the opportunity to receive an education.
There are practical problems, however, with this approach. By participating in
a professional division, the universities are adding what is essentially an entertainment business to their academic portfolio. In doing so, they taint their academic mission to some extent, given that the teams will presumably carry the
university's name, even though the team members are not students.
Under the Sack and Staurowsky model, the athlete must be admitted to the
institution, but he does not have to be an enrolled student while participating in
the professional league.' 17 Admission is a prerequisite for the athlete to be
permitted to participate for the institution in the league."18 The athlete then has
ten (10) years from the time he enrolls to take advantage of the tuition credits
earned while participating in the professional division, and he earns one (1)
year of tuition credit, together with other benefits received, for each year he
participates in the professional league. 119 Under the current system, major
universities offer academic support (e.g., tutors and structured study time).
Sack and Staurowsky do not offer any academic and emotional support like that
received by student-athletes in many programs today. Furthermore, coaches
and administrators will have little incentive to assist in graduating athletesturned-students, because the athletes will have used up their eligibility and their
11

6 Supra notes 81-98, and accompanying text.
7 Rejoinder, supra note 21, at 120-121.

11

118 id.
119

1d.
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failure to graduate will not reflect poorly on the coach's program. Without
such academic support and encouragement from the coaches, it is possible that
the athlete-turned-student under the Sack and Staurowsky model will not
graduate at levels commensurate with those obtained under the current sys20
tem. 1
Another academic matter that deserves more study is the Sack and
Staurowsky conclusion that the athlete will benefit by not going to school while
participating in intercollegiate athletics. There is some indication that studentathletes perform better in the classroom during the season than out-of-season.
While this is somewhat counter-intuitive, given the time demands placed on an
athlete during the season which clearly deprives the athlete of study time, it
may be that the athlete is more disciplined during the season and receives more
academic support. During the season, many student-athletes are required to attend study sessions and their attention to academic matters is closely monitored.
Athletes could lose this academic benefit under the Sack and
Staurowsky proposal.
A final academic matter not addressed by Sack and Stauwrowsky is the
time required to graduate. Currently, many students take five or more years to
graduate. As previously noted, even the NCAA accumulates its graduation
rates on a six-year basis.'
Under the Sack and Staurowsky model, however,
the athlete would only receive one year of scholarship or aid for each year
played, which would presumably be four years. That four-year scholarship
may well be insufficient for the athlete turned student to graduate. It is worth
noting, as well, that if the athlete has to wait four years before entering school,
he may have many personal reasons for declining to use the grant-in-aid. He
will have become an older, nontraditional student and may have family or other
responsibilities that make attendance as a full-time student prohibitive.
Sack and Staurowsky also seek, at least implicitly, to deal with the social
implications for the athlete. During his playing career, the athlete would essentially be an entertainer and would not be treated as a student. Later, the athlete
would become a student and presumably would be treated like all other students. At that juncture, at least, the athlete would not suffer any stigma or ambivalence of role. He would be a student, just like any other student, although
he may be older and may still carry some of the fame or notoriety of being an
athlete.
There are also practical problems of both a legal and structural nature with
the Sack and Staurowsky model. As a legal matter, given that athletes are now
paid employees and the athletic enterprise has clearly become a business, a
myriad of legal issues will have to be addressed, with all the actual and transaction costs that such legalization of "big-time" intercollegiate athletics would
120Of course,

Sack and Staurowsky can argue that permitting the athlete turned student to go
full time will more than compensate for the loss of academic support and coaching encouragement under the current system.
121Supra note 15, and accompanying text.
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entail.122 As a structural matter, the Sack and Staurowsky model would involve
a major change in the governance structure of intercollegiate athletics. It might
even threaten governance in other areas, since the NCAA derives much of its
funding for governance purposes from revenues generated by the very programs that would be contained in the professional category envisioned by Sack
and Staurowsky. Once again, a new paradigm would bring with it numerous
and perhaps even intractable structural problems. Sack and Staurowsky have
not evidenced much forethought in this regard.
As was the case with the Acain Plan, the Sack and Staurowsky model appears to address problems associated with the current operation of "big-time"
intercollegiate athletics. It does so in a manner that raises many questions and
might ultimately do more harm than good. Given the difficulty of new paradigms, less ambitious proposals have been offered, such as the stipend approach suggested by Dean C. Peter Goplerud III.
C. ScholarshipPlus Stipend Approach
Dean Goplerud is particularly concerned with the fact that not enough
attention is paid to the welfare of college athletes. 23 Goplerud believes that the
relaxation of the student-athlete work rules adopted by the NCAA was well intentioned, but he asserts that they add yet one more element into the already
time-crunched schedule of the athlete. 124 Additionally, Goplerud raises the
concern that athletes might receive pay for no work, which would create an
NCAA enforcement "nightmare."' 125 Based on these concerns and a recognition that "big-time" college athletes are being treated in an economically inequitable manner, Goplerud asserts that it is time to compensate these athletes because "[w]e are no longer in an age of innocence where there is no
commercialism in college athletics. It is big business and those most responsi126
ble for the product put on the field, the players, should be compensated.'
Goplerud proposes that the NCAA develop legislation permitting compensation, in the form of stipends, to student athletes participating in Division I
major revenue producing sports. 12 7 These stipends would be available to men's
football and basketball, and women's basketball, volleyball, and other sports
necessary to satisfy gender equity requirements. 128 The amount of stipend distributed to each athlete would be determined at the129individual institution's disThis salary cap would be
cretion, subject to an over-all NCAA "salary cap."'

122

For an outline discussion of these issues see infra page 41.

123

Gopelrud, supra note 12, at 1105.
Id.

124

125 id.
126 idl.

127

Id. at 1089.

128

Id.

129 Id.
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set at $300 a month per scholarship student-athlete.' 30 Half of the stipend
would be deposited in a trust fund, which would be distributed to studentathletes obtaining a degree "within five years of matriculation."' '3 The schools
that support football programs would conduct an independent calculation for
their football costs, which would vary depending upon whether the school is
Division I-A or Division I-AA. 132 As permitted under the recently enacted
NCAA rule, student-athletes would be allowed to work, yet they would still receive a stipend, which would not be counted against the "cost of attendance" at
the university.' 33 As long as the school does not exceed the salary cap, they
can choose the amounts of the dividends paid to the athletes, whether very little, or if the school thought it necessary, none at all. 134 Additionally, those
grants-in-aid athletes participating in nonrevenue-producing sports could work
during the school year, and would have no maximum earnings cap.' 35 Furthermore, under the scholarship-stipend approach, jobs
must be accessible to
36
the general student body as well as student athletes.'
The Goplerud proposal is designed to deal with the economic inequities
suffered by "big-time" athletes by permitting them to receive a stipend for their
services. For Title IX reasons, however, he offers the stipend to athletes, particularly women, in nonrevenue-producing sports. Thus, rather than dealing
with the economic inequity that currently exists, he may merely be compounding it. Furthermore, Goplerud does not tie his stipend directly to revenue production and profitability. While the proposal is a thoughtful effort to blend
economic and educational values in an equitable manner, it is flawed as an approach to economic inequity arguments, because Goplerud does not evaluate it
in light of actual revenues generated.
However, Peter Goplerud's stipend proposal does address academic inequities currently suffered by student-athletes in the major revenue-producing athletic programs. He demonstrates concern for academic values, by maintaining
much of the current program and adding some incentives, and by requiring that
a substantial portion of the stipend be placed in a trust to be received by a student-athlete if he graduates within five years. Yet, Goplerud's proposal does
not directly address social implications that arise in "big-time" athletic programs. Student-athletes may continue to feel stigmatized. Indeed, being paid
stipends for their performance may add to their sense that they are athletes first
and students second.
Moreover, Goplerud's proposal generates some practical problems. He
endeavors to avoid the legal problems associated with Title IX and gender eq130 Id.
131 id.
132 id.
133 Id.

134id.
135 id.
136

id.
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uity by making women's programs at the Division I level eligible for the stipend, even though those programs generally are not revenue-producing. 37 It is
not clear, however, that he has avoided Title IX problems. He indicates that
women athletes may receive the stipends, but he also permits institutions some
flexibility in paying the stipends (i.e., they can pay less than the cap). It is unclear whether the Goplerud plan could pay some athletes more and others less,
generally or at a particular institution, which might create potential Title IX
problems if women are paid less in either event. 138 The Goplerud plan also
fails to avoid some legal issues (e.g., tax and workers compensation issues) that
will arise if the stipend is considered compensation, which it might be since it
is tied to performance.
The cap is itself one of a number of practical wrinkles to the Goplerud proposal that deserves more attention. He does not require institutions to provide
the compensation. This will no doubt raise contractual issues with studentathletes who believe they have been promised a certain salary or compensation
in some form. It will also create an imbalance in the playing field between institutions that pay the stipend and those that do not, further exacerbating the
growing rift between major programs with the dollars required to fund the stipend and those that do not have the necessary dollars.
Given its apparent simplicity, the stipend approach suggested by Goplerud
would appear to avoid structural issues. However, this is not so clear on a
closer examination. If, in fact, his proposal widens the rift between schools
able to pay the stipend and those unable or unwilling to pay, it may give rise to
structural and governance problems. Schools paying the stipend will have a
competitive edge in recruiting, which should translate itself into success in
terms of performance. Thus, the proposal might require creation of a new division, with separate rules or, at a minimum, new rules outlining how the stipend
is to be calculated and dispersed.
Thus, while the Goplerud proposal does not rise to the level of a new paradigm, it endeavors in some measure to deal with economic and academic inequities while leaving many unanswered questions and may, in reality, do very
little to address economic and academic inequities that currently are present in
"big-time" intercollegiate athletics. It raises too many questions for the limited
benefit likely to be recognized by student-athletes and may effectively do little
more than is currently being done by the NCAA.

137 Of course, this will increase the expense of the stipends at the institutional level. In
this
regard, Dean Goplerud fails to examine economic and related implications of his proposal.
For example, he indicates that the institutions will pay these costs, but he does not state
where they will obtain the necessary funding.
138 See infra at notes 203-210, and accompanying text, for a discussion of possible Title IX
problems and solutions regarding variable stipends for men and women student-athletes.
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D. The NCAA Model
In 1906, at the first convention of the Intercollegiate Athletic Association,
the predecessor to the NCAA, the idea of inducements for athletic ability was
proposed.139 The amateur model, then prevailing in intercollegiate athletics,
did not support aid to students through grants or other forms of financial aid for
athletic performance. 40 Naturally, there was much opposition to the idea of
scholarships, when it was first proposed. 14 1 Much of this historical opposition
was based on elitist notions of athletic participation and the value of amateurism, often rooted in British aristocracy. 142 Academic concerns were also raised
and centered on the idea that if students were subsidized for their athletic participation, they would not focus on their educational goals. 143 Today, educators
in the Ivy League and Division III continue to espouse these views, arguing that
the grant of athletic scholarships creates a group of sports specialists 1that turns
intercollegiate athletics into "more of a profession than an avocation." "
Given the strength of these concerns among educators, it was not until
1956 that the NCAA, under rising pressure from athletics personnel, changed
their constitution to permit scholarships based on athletic ability. 45 In 1957,
these grants-in-aid, based on athletic ability, provided for room, board, tuition,
fees and laundry money.146 Walter Byers, who was then serving as the Executive Director of the NCAA, thought that athletic-based scholarships were themselves little more than a "laundering scheme," with athletes being permitted to
receive money, once given "under the table," directly from university
sources. 14 7 While Byers was uneasy about the growing commercialization of
intercollegiate athletics, he may have helped fuel this commercialization by
overseeing
entry into the first major agreements to televise intercollegiate ath48
letics.'
As originally instituted, the scholarships were designed as gifts (grants-inaid), and the student-athlete was able to retain the four year grant even if he
ceased to participate in athletics for personal reasons or simply because he
failed to contribute to the team.149 Not surprisingly, athletics and university
139Rejoinder, supra note

21, at 118.

140Id.
141 Id.
142 id.
143 Id.

144id.
145Id. at 118-19.
146Id. at 119.

147
Id. (citing Walter Byers, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Exploiting CollegeAthletes (1995)).
148
See Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National CollegiateAthletic Association's
Role in Regulating IntercollegiateAthletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 9 (2000) (based on a
presentation given at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in
January, 2000).
149Rejoinder, supra note 21, at 119.
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personnel began to be oppose treating these grants as gifts, without requiring
that the athletes remain on the team. 50 As a result, in 1967, the NCAA
changed the athletic grants-in-aid from a "gift" to more of a "contractual quid
pro quo."' 51 This change in status gave coaches and athletics administrators
greater control, financially and otherwise, over the athletes' educational future,
and institutions were effectively able to eliminate financial aid when studentathletes ceased to participate as an active member of the team. For example, in
addition to terminating the grant-in-aid when the athlete quit the team, a student-athlete could lose his aid if he failed to follow the directions of his coaches
and athletics personnel. 5 2
While the 1967 changes in the scholarship status of student-athletes eliminated those athletes who failed to play or take their commitment seriously, it
did not eliminate those athletes who were forced to quit due to injuries or those
athletes who were recruiting errors.' 53 The NCAA dealt with these problems,
to some extent, by turning the four-year grant-in-aid into a grant that had to be
renewed on an annual basis. 154 While institutions, through their coaches and
athletics personnel, may effectively remove "dead wood," athletes who do not
perform up to recruiting expectations or who are injured, 155 the student-athlete
is not able to transfer or leave one school for another on an annual basis, without first receiving approval from the institution where he initially played and
may even lose a year of eligibility because of a transfer. 156 It is clear that the
scholarship agreement, based on the letter of intent signed by an athlete,1 57favors
the institution and may be unconscionable for this reason among others.
Nevertheless, scholarships and grants-in-aid remain an important source of
compensation for student-athletes. The economic value of a grant-in-aid is substantial. For example, in the Big-10, the average value of a one-year grant-inaid, based on 1999-2000 figures, was $14,712.00 for a resident and $22,584.00
for a non-resident, with a high of $34,476.00 at Northwestern University and a
low of $11,450.00 for a resident at the University of Wisconsin.158 Over a fiveyear period, covering four years of eligibility, these figures jump in value to an
150 Id.
151Id.
152 Id. Failure to attend practices and meet athletics department expectations was considered
a misrepresentation of the athlete's admission application and letter of intent, which served
to further solidify the idea that the student-athlete and the institution were involved in a contractual relationship.
"' Id. at 120.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156 See 1999-2000 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, Article 14.5.1, which sets forth the general
rule regarding transferring from one institution to another: "A student who transfers (see
14.5.2) to a member institution from any collegiate institution is required to complete one
full academic year of residence at the certifying institution before being eligible to compete
for or to receive travel expenses from the member institution ....
157 See, Davis, Unconscionability,supra note 14.
158
See, infra, Appendix, Table 1.
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value to an averageof $81,295 for residents and $124,932 for non-residents,
with a high of $172,380 at Northwestem. 159 It is evident, therefore, that a
grant-in-aid is of substantial dollar value to a student-athlete. The value of the
grant increases dramatically, in terms of income, over the lifetime of a studentathlete who graduates.
There is also some lifetime economic benefit to student-athletes who attend but do not graduate from a university, since employees
with some higher education tend to generate a higher income over the course of
their working lives than do employees with only a high school education.
However, that economic benefit is much less than the benefit accruing to a
6
graduate. 1 1
The Division I Board of Directors recently approved a proposal that permits institutions to provide financial aid during the summer term for entering
basketball student-athletes.' 62 This move was intended to aid the studentathlete in making the academic transition to higher education and enable him
easily to receive the twelve hours necessary to be in good standing after his initial fall semester. The Board of Directors also revisited a proposal, that was
previously defeated by the Council, which would have required male basketball
student-athletes to successfully complete a minimum of 12 hours acceptable
63
toward a degree by the end of the first full term (fall) of their freshman year.1
In supporting this effort and related initiatives, including the creation of the Division I Basketball Issues Committee," 64 Graham B. Spanier, Chair of the
Board of Directors of the NCAA and President of Pennsylvania State University, emphasized that, "[m]y presidential colleagues and I believe that the current graduation rates are unacceptable among college basketball players. The
Board also has a strong commitment to strengthening academic standards as
early in the student-athlete's college career as possible."'' 65 This effort to increase financial aid in the furtherance of the NCAA's goal of heightened academic performance on the part of student-athletes in Division I basketball illustrates the NCAA's willingness to entertain economic incentives to studentathletes designed to improve academic performance.
The NCAA also recently took a potentially significant structural step that
may ultimately enable it to initiate an era of significant reform in Division I
men's basketball, when the Board of Directors adopted Proposal 132-B, which
established a new Division I Basketball Issues Committee. 166 In reporting the
formation of this Committee, Graham Spanier, stated, "[t]his is one of the
159
See, infra, Appendix, Table 3..

160 Supra notes 89-90. See also discussion at infra note 181, and accompanying text.
161Id.

162NCAA Division I Board of DirectorsApproves Basketball Package,Seeks Other Reforms,
NCAA NEWS RELEASE, (April 27, 2000) <http://www.ncaa.org>.

163 id.
164Id.

165 Id.

166NCAA Division I Board of Directors Approves Basketball Issues Committee, NCAA
NEWS RELEASE, (August 10, 2000) <http://www.ncaa.org>.
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NCAA's most important initiatives in recent years... An overriding concern
for us was putting together a committee that fairly represented the basketball
constituency of Division I." 167 He added that, "[i]t is important that all voices
are heard."' 168 This Committee will engage in evaluating research and making
recommendations to the Board of Directors on a regular basis. As such, it
could well become a major vehicle for reform in Division I men's basketball in
the future.
In 1997, the NCAA voted to allow student-athletes at the Division I level
the opportunity to hold a part-time job, while receiving scholarship support, as
a means of providing the student-athlete with more spending money.169 Proposition 62, which allows student-athletes to hold such part-time jobs, was
adopted by a very narrow margin: 169 delegates for and 150 delegates opposed.' 70 Opponents of Proposition 62 argued that it would create enforcement
problems and permit institutions to try to compensate athletes by giving them
"no show" or "pay-for-athletic participation" jobs. 171 After passage, Sam
Smith, chairperson of the NCAA President's Commission, acknowledged that
there were many legitimate problems in application that must be faced under
Proposition 62, but he believed that it was a step in the right direction. 172 In
April of 1998, the NCAA Division I Management Council approved Proposition 62, permitting student-athletes in Division I to hold part-time jobs and earn
up to $2000 during the academic year. 73
In addition to providing student-athletes with the opportunity to hold parttime jobs during the academic year,' 74 Cedric Dempsey, executive director of
the NCAA, has suggested that $10,000,000 of the new television contract revenue be designated for clothing, emergency travel and other special needs of student-athletes. 75 He added that it is his intent to "propose that 1these
funds be
76
increased and made more flexible for assisting student-athletes."'
Given the value of grants-in-aid and other support for student-athletes,
such as tutoring and other forms of academic support, member institutions of
the NCAA are already offering substantial compensation to student-athletes.
Of course, with the exception of some tutoring or related academic benefits directed specifically to men's basketball and football players, student-athletes in
nonrevenue-producing programs receive similar benefits, even though they do
167

id.
id.
169 The working athlete, THE SEATrLE
168

<http://www.seattletimes.com>.
170 id.

171 Id.
172 id.

173 Id.
174

See supra note 1.

175

Id.

176 id.

TIMES

(Jan. 18, 1997)
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not generate the income required to cover the cost of such expenses related to
providing those benefits.
The NCAA's compensation model has significant strengths. Obviously, it
avoids the structural problems often incident in the other models or proposals,
because it is already designed to fit easily into the regulations adopted by the
NCAA for the governance of Division I athletics. Changes, such as the parttime income proposal (Proposition 62) and Director Dempsey's recommendation of additional benefits, will have to be incorporated in the rules. The
NCAA's recommended changes, however, are less dramatic and require far less
change in the regulations and governance structure than many other proposals
for change.
Furthermore, the NCAA's compensation model focuses largely on educational benefits and, by doing so, it furthers academic values. As previously
noted, 177 however, the poor graduation rates for men's basketball and football
players at the Division I level raise questions regarding the extent to which
such academic values are actually being furthered. These concerns are compounded by the economic necessity of producing revenues in men's football
and basketball to support less profitable athletic programs at an institution. The
need to produce revenue can put time and related demands on the studentathlete that do not necessarily exist in other programs. This emphasis on economic factors may also adversely impact the student-athlete's sense of his reason for being at the institution. The student-athlete may justifiably wonder
whether his real reason for being at an institution, in the eyes of the institution,
is primarily economic and not educational.
Concerns also arise relative to aspects of the inequitable nature of the
NCAA's compensation model. The student-athletes producing most of the
revenue, which fuel athletics operations at Division I institutions, are involved
in men's basketball and football. Athletes of color predominate in those sports
and they produce significant revenue, which is used to help fund nonrevenueproducing programs that are heavily populated by white students, many of
whom are middle and upper-middle class. 78 It is this inequity that no doubt
has spurred Director Dempsey and others to support some compensation for
student-athletes in men's basketball.
However, in trying to address such inequities, the NCAA is up against two
significant obstacles. One obstacle is simply that of intransigence. Because the
men's basketball and football players lack bargaining power,' 79 there is little
pressure placed on administrators to respond to this inequity. Administrators
are often crisis managers, and simply do not have the time, the inclination, nor
the energy necessary to respond to problems of inequity unless they are raised
by powerful constituencies at or external to the institution. Many of them may
177 Supra notes 15-16, and accompanying text.
178 Supra notes 7-9, and accompanying text.
179
Davis, Unconscionability,supra note 14.
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recognize that serious problems exist, but those problems are unlikely to get
much attention until they become crises. The NCAA's recent effort to create a
Division I Basketball Issues Committee to study and make recommendations
regarding academic and economic issues that must be addressed, may .be a
means of moving such issues to the forefront and is evidence that the NCAA
that lead to intransigence, in terms of
appears to recognize current difficulties
0
reform, at the institutional level.18
The other problem that makes it difficult to address these economic inequities, despite claims of inequitable treatment, is largely legal in nature. Administrators are fearful of Title IX limitations of differing treatment of men and
women in intercollegiate athletics. If they provide more funding to men's basketball and football, the revenue-producing sports, they justifiably fear that Title IX claims may be raised, resulting in transactional and economic costs to the
institution, as the institution is challenged to provide similar aid to women's
programs. These factors make it very difficult for the NCAA to address problems of inequity.
IV. OUR ECONOMIC AND ACADEMIC EQUITY MODEL

Each of the four models discussed have substantial virtues. The first
three are significant efforts to deal with issues of economic inequity in "bigtime" men's football and basketball. Each of these three models, however, also
have deficiencies at a number of levels, ranging from structural problems in
implementation to a lack of details in terms of the particulars of the recommendations. Even more significant, each of the first three proposals or models fails
to address directly issues of academic inequity and integrity. The NCAA
model, on the other hand, does a somewhat better job of dealing with academic
and structural issues, even though serious questions can be raised in terms of
academic equity and integrity issues that remain unresolved. The NCAA's
model is weaker than the other models in many respects in terms of its treatment of issues of economic inequity.
In the following proposal or model, we endeavor to deal directly with issues of economic and academic integrity, drawing on the strengths and learning
from the weaknesses of each of the models outlined in this article. At a minimum, we hope to stimulate further the dialogue that will ultimately give rise to
reform in the future. In our more optimistic moments, we believe that the recommendations we suggest can provide the basis for meaningful change in "bigtime" intercollegiate athletics - change that will help achieve economic equity
without unduly compromising the rightful academic mission of institutions and
student-athletes.
Poor graduation rates among student-athletes in men's football and basketball at the Division I level, particularly the lower rates among athletes-ofcolor, raise serious questions of academic and economic inequity. On the one
180See supra notes 162-164, and accompanying text.
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hand, when institutions recruit a student-athlete to participate in "big-time" intercollegiate athletics, the major value that they offer the student-athlete is a
grant-in-aid and the opportunity to receive an education. Low graduation rates
raise legitimate questions regarding the commitment of institutions to provide a
genuine educational opportunity to student-athletes. It is not surprising, therefore, that critics claim that student-athletes are being exploited in the sense that
they are hired to help maintain the commercial viability of the institution's athletic program and are not receiving the educational quid pro quo offered by the
institution as an inducement to bring their athletic skills to campus. Economically, these student-athletes are expected to produce revenues to fund their program and other nonrevenue-producing programs at the school, as well as providing significant funding for the Conferences and the NCAA, while failing to
receive the educational benefits that would make their agreement with the institution equitable.
Recognizing these and related problems, the other models have suggested
moving toward a purer professional model than now exists in "big-time" intercollegiate athletics. They suggest increased compensation for the athletes in
some form. In doing so, they also note that the current system is hypocritical in
the sense that it purports to be based on academic values but is really little more
than a thinly veiled professional program. In contrast, while we recognize that
the NCAA itself provides a limited professional or compensation model, we
argue that the compensation and education issues can be reconciled in a manner
that removes much of the inequity present in the current system.
We recommend major changes in the area of grants-in-aid that will increase graduation rates and, therefore, compensation for the student-athletes.
We also discuss funding and implementation issues that have made reform difficult in the past.
A. Grants-in-Aid
The value of a degree is substantial. In current dollars, based on labor statistics, it is generally worth in excess of $500,000, during the working life of an
individual. 18 ' Therefore, increasing graduation rates among student-athletes in
the revenue-producing sports is a way of providing them with substantial compensation, in addition to the value of the grant-in-aid itself. Increasing graduation rates will also respond to concerns regarding educational equity, because
success in this area is evidence that the institutions have fulfilled their part of
'1 lThe United States Census Bureau released figures in 1998 regarding the earnings gap between people with a high school education and those with bachelors degrees. In those figures the Bureau stated that college graduates made an average of $40,500 in the prior year,
while the average high school graduate earned $22,000.

People with bachelorIs degrees,

therefore, earned an average of over 75% more per annum than high school graduates. At
over $18,000 per year in additional average income, and an expected working life of thirty
years, the difference is $540,000 in current dollars.
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the bargain by providing their student-athletes with an actual education. 182 Efforts to increase graduation rates among these student-athletes can simultaneously deal with issues of academic and educational inequity. Much of the focus
of our proposals, therefore, is to provide for an increase in graduation rates
among student-athletes in the revenue-producing sports. It must be conceded,
however, that our proposals do not deal with the amateurism concerns raised by
Sack and Staurowsky. 183 Indeed, as to revenue-producing athletic programs,
we not only concede that they are "professional" but build on that premise,
insuring that meaningful compensation is received by the student-athletes, who
unlike their counterparts in other Divisions and nonrevenue-producing programs, are due additional compensation for the additional revenues they are
significantly involved in producing.
Under our model, student-athletes participating in men's football and basketball at the Division I level are permitted to receive up to six years of grantsin-aid. The NCAA's graduation figures are themselves based on the number of
student-athletes graduating within six years. Under the current system, these
student-athletes can receive up to five years of assistance in the form of grantsin-aid; four years of grant for years the student-athlete participates in intercollegiate athletics and the possibility of a fifth year when the student receives aid
but is red-shirted . 184 Some schools even provide an additional year of scholarship to student-athletes who use their four years of eligibility without being redshirted for a year. 185 Thus, a number of student-athletes receive five years of
grant support to use in obtaining their education and degree. It is clear, however, that graduation rates could be improved if institutions were required to
provide a sixth year in grant assistance, which would comport with the six year
figure used in compiling graduation rates by the NCAA. Given that there is
evidence that student-athletes may perform better academically while playing,
as opposed to when they are out of season, 186 it makes sense to permit the student-athlete to retain eligibility during that fifth and sixth year. This could result in higher graduation rates, as well. Our model does not necessarily antici182

We certainly recognize that a degree does not equal an education. By the same token,

however, it is clear that a degree is evidence of an education. As such, it has value in the
workplace, value that is generally translatable into higher economic compensation over the
course of one's lifetime.
183 Sack & Staurowsky, supra note 10.
184 An athlete who is red-shirted receives his grant-in-aid, practices with the team, but does
not play in any games, thereby retaining four additional years of eligibility. In this regard,
NCAA Bylaw 14.2.1 provides, in pertinent part, that: "A student-athlete shall complete his
or her seasons of participation within five calendar years from the beginning of the semester
or quarter in which the student-athlete first registered for a minimum full-time program of
studies in a collegiate institution .... 1999-00 NCAA DivisioN I MANUAL, Article 14.2.1.
185 The authors are personally aware of schools provide their student-athletes with continuing assistance after the athletes have completed their eligibility. This is an admirable practice,
but it is variable.
186 See, e.g., Timothy Davis, An Absence of Good Faith:Defining a University's Educational
Obligation to Student Athletes, 28 Hous. L. REv. 743, 754-56 (1991).
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pate an increase in the number of grants-in-aid to be offered. Rather, institutions would maintain the level of grants permitted but would parcel them out
over the six years of eligibility. This may result in fewer grants being awarded
to some entering freshmen thus leading to a consequent loss in opportunities for
entering first-year students. However, the additional academic benefit for student-athletes who do matriculate should more than counter-balance this negative factor. This is an area which should be studied to ascertain the impact on
potential and existing student-athletes and determine levels of academic performance during season. In this latter sense, it will be worthwhile to discover
whether students do better in season than out-of-season. If a student performs
better when playing, this increase in eligibility may have additional educational
benefits. If he does not perform as well during season, this will present a new
set of problems, which should be offset by the additional years of eligibility and
financial aid anticipated in this proposal.
To ensure further that these additional grants actually translate into higher
graduation rates, we also recommend some disincentives for institutions with
programs that do not achieve graduation rates at an acceptable level and additional incentives for programs that exceed certain levels of performance in
terms of graduation rates. As disincentives, we suggest that institutions that
have graduation rates below certain levels be required to reduce the number of
scholarships offered in the offending program. In this regard, we are building
on a proposal already suggested by the Board of Directors of the NCAA which,
if adopted, would provide for a reduction by one in grants-in-aids at Division I
men's basketball programs where graduation rates drop below 50%. 187 We also
recommend incentives, in the form of increased scholarships, for programs with
higher graduation rates.
In men's football, for example, graduation rates are reported to average
51% generally.' s 8 Institutions with graduation rates that drop below that rate,
in football, under our proposal, will lose grants-in-aid. Currently, each Division I-A institution with a football team is permitted to award a maximum of 85
grants-in-aid. 189 If an institution has a graduation rate of 46-50%, it will lose
187 See

discussion supra note 162. Our proposal, which provides for additional reductions,

however, is likely to result in more dramatic action on the part of programs. Frankly, if only
one scholarship is lost, the institution that graduates 20% of its players may simply write-off
the lost grant-in-aid. They will not like having to lose it, but the difficulty of increasing
graduation rates to the 50% level may be such that they simply are not willing to try. They
may even perceive some slight advantage to being able to recruit players whom they believe
are unlikely to graduate, but may be fine athletes, over institutions that are unwilling to recruit those athletes for fear of the effect it will have on their graduation rates. Under our proposal, however, such an institution would lose more than a single scholarship and would
have significant reasons to increase graduation rates and academic progress.
188 Supra note 15.

189The rule for Division I-A football provides that, "[t]here shall be an annual limit of 25 on
the number of initial counters (per Article 15.02.3.1) and an annual limit of 85 on the total
number of counters (including initial counters) in the sport of football at each Division I-A
institution." 1999-2000 NCAA DIvisION I MANUAL, Article 15.5.5.1.
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one grant-in-aid. A graduation rate of 41-45% will result in the loss of two
grants; 36-40% results in the loss of three grants; 31-35% results in the loss of
4 grants; 26-29% results in the loss of 5 grants, and so forth. On the other
hand, if a coach graduates 51-55% of his players, he will receive an increase of
one grant over the current limit of 85; if 56-60% graduate, the program will be
awarded 2 new grants; if 61-65% graduate, three new grants will be awarded; if
66-70% graduate, four new grants-in-aid may be awarded, etc. With a 100 percent graduation rate, institutions would be permitted to add a total of 9 grants in
Division I-A men's football.
A similar system of incentives and disincentives are proposed in men's
basketball at the Division I level. Currently, 41% of the athletes graduate in
men's basketball at this level. In terms of disincentives, therefore, we suggest
that if a program graduates only 30-40% of their players, they will lose a grantin-aid; two grants will be lost in programs with graduation rates between 2130%; three will be lost when the graduation rate falls to 11-20%; and, finally,
four grants-in-aid, out of the thirteen currently allowed, will be lost in programs
with graduation rates of 0-10%. Incentives will also be given: programs with
graduation rates of 41-50% will receive an additional scholarship; programs
graduating 51-60% of their players will receive two new scholarships; 61-70%
graduation rates will result in a three grant increase; 71-80% will make four
new grants available; 81-90% graduation rates will result in five new grants;
and 91-100% graduation rates will provide the program with six new grants-inaid, raising their scholarship limit from 13 to 19.
These incentives will induce coaches and administrators at institutions with
lower graduation rates to find ways to improve their performance, knowing that
the number of grants available will directly impact their capacity to recruit and
develop a successful program. Today, coaches are occasionally given small
contractual incentives for increased graduation rates, in terms of their overall
income package. These incentives are such a minor part of the total value of an
institution's agreement with the coach, that they really are of little impact in
terms of inducing coaches to work hard to graduate their players. A coach
knows that if he wins, and his team produces revenue, he will keep his job and
receive significant increases in his income. If he graduates 100% of his student-athletes, but fails to win and produce revenue at an expected level, he will
lose his job and income. Similarly, while administrators, including presidents,
would like to see higher graduation rates for their student-athletes in revenueproducing sports, they are unlikely to do anything to increase graduation rates
unilaterally at the institutional level if those efforts might result in less success
in the program and a decline in coveted revenues. Even if administrators do
not worry about the potential adverse competitive and economic impact of creating more stringent expectations for coaches in terms of graduation rates, at
present they simply do not have much incentive to act - administrators do not
perceive an institutional crisis, and leaders in higher education must, of necessity, be crisis managers. Without a perceived crisis, they will necessarily turn
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their energy to areas that are more critical and demand their immediate attention. Coaches and athletics administrators, therefore, need stronger incentives
to graduate students. Our proposal provides just such an impetus for greater
action to ensure higher graduation rates.
We also recommend some economic incentives for the student-athlete to
maintain the regular academic progress necessary to graduate within 6 years.
We suggest that monetary stipends be paid to student-athletes in major revenue
producing sports. For example, if a freshman has passed his required courses
and evidenced academic progress in his first semester, he will receive a
monthly stipend of $50. If, at the end of the first year, he has made the requisite progress, based on a six-year graduation scale, he will receive $100 per
month during the following academic year as his stipend. After year two, if he
has continued to make academic progress, he will receive a $200 stipend; after
year three of maintaining academic progress, he will receive $300; four years
will result in a monthly stipend of $400; and after five years, in his sixth and
final year of eligibility, the student-athlete's stipend will be $500 per month.
These stipends will recognize the student-athlete's academic efforts in a very
direct manner. Incentives of this sort are far preferable to Proposition 62,
which permits student-athletes to work to obtain additional income. Given the
hours required of student-athletes, Proposition 62 may actually detract from
academic performance, because student-athletes in revenue-producing sports
will have to work at their sport and their part-time job, both of which take them
out of the classroom.
Our recommendations were developed for the purpose of directly addressing current inequities in terms of educational values, evidenced by graduation
rates and economic fairness, by increasing both short and long-term compensation to intercollegiate athletes. In this regard, our model also recognizes, as
Sack and Staurowsky do, that the revenue-producing sports have essentially
been professionalized. Thus, while we emphasize both economic equity and
academic values, we do not accept that the achievement of educational values
requires a purely amateur system. Rather, we realistically recognize that such a
system of amateurism is not practical in []big-time" revenue-producing athletics, and actually lends itself to the economic inequities raised by so many commentators. 190

Our proposals might be subject to some criticism on the ground that they
lack specificity and detail. Indeed, we concede that our recommendations, in
terms of grants-in-aid incentives and disincentives, stipends, and increased eligibility, need to be studied in more detail. In that sense, we acknowledge that
the numbers and dollars we suggest at each level are really only illustrative of a
range of possibilities and are subject to revision in the interests of ultimate implementation.
We recognize two major problems, however, with our approach: 1) finding
190 See discussion supra notes 28-36, and accompanying text.

Spring 20011

PROMISES TO STUDENTATHLETES

adequate sources of funding for the substantial new expenses created by our
recommendations; and 2) Title IX and gender equity implications, in terms of
costs and legal obligations. Recognizing these major potential obstacles to implementation of our proposals, we have further suggestions regarding each of
those areas.
Questions of funding necessarily arise, relative to our proposal, because it
anticipates substantial increases in grants-in-aid, stipends for students, and increased eligibility. With growing concern over proliferating expenses in intercollegiate athletics,1 91 it is necessary, at least in a practical sense, to address
economic issues. In terms of grants-in-aid, assuming that the average grant-inaid is worth $15,000 per year,' 92 if each Division I-A, I-AA and I-AAA institution added four grants-in-aid per year' 93 in men's basketball, in the form of incentives for increased graduation rates, the cost would be almost
$20,000,000,19' arguably a small price to pay for increased graduation rates. In
turn, if stipends averaging $300 per month were paid to all Division I-A, I-AA
and I-AAA men's basketball players, the total cost would be less than
$20,000,000.'9' Even if the costs exceeded those figures, which are intended to
191A recent article in the CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION depicts this perceived problem

regarding expenses:
[B]oth the revenue and expenses of athletics programs are increasing rapidly, said Mr.
Isch, the NCAA's Vice President for Finance and Information Services. According to a
report to be released this fall, athletics-related revenue has increased 60 percent since
1993, expenses are up 70 percent, salaries and benefits for administrators and coaches
are up 47 percent, and capital costs have increased 260 percent, he noted.
Welch Suggs, 10 Years Later, Another Look at Big-Time College Sports, THE CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUCATION, (September 8, 2000) at A69.
President Dempsey is also quoted as stating that institutions are in an "arms race" in
terms of salaries, facilities, and other aspects of athletics departments. Id. Interestingly, in
this article by Welch Suggs regarding the first meeting of the reconstituted Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, issues of racial inequity were also raised in
terms of the membership of the Commission. Robert J. Minnix, President of the Black
Coaches Association is reported as stating, "In order for Presidents and C.E.O.'s of our nationls colleges to make the issue [of racial equity] a top priority, it is necessary for the
Knight Commission to lead by example in these efforts... If the Knight Commission continues to include only those of the majority culture, then the B.C.A. has no choice but to call
their integrity and goodwill into question." 1d. at A70. President LeRoy T. Walker, a Commission member and former president of North Carolina Central University, expressed the
following concerns: "Sixty to 70 percent of the issues we're considering - grades, graduation
rates, paying athletes - all center around two sports: football and basketball.... And the majority of players in those two sports are black." Id.
192 The average grant-in-aid in the Big-10 is $14,712, and the average in the S.E.C. is
$12,576. See Appendix.
193This figure is intended to be on the high side. It would be wonderful to see graduation
rates increased so that these grants-in-aid would have to be funded.
194 This figure is based on the following equation: 318 (the number of Division I-A, I-AA
and I-AAA institutions) times 4 (the number of grants added, which represents an average
graduation rate of 60%, which is 20% higher than the current rate) times $15,000 (the average cost of a grant-in-aid). The total is $19,080,000.
195 This figure was arrived at by multiplying the total number of Division I-A, I-AA, and I-
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be on the high side and anticipate a dramatic increase in graduation rates and
academic performance on the part of student-athletes in Division I-A, I-AA and
I-AAA men's basketball, the NCAA is in a position to fund the cost of these
incentives. Indeed, even if the total expense went as high as $25,000,000, that
expense would be a mere 5% of the total amount of revenue payable to the
NCAA for its annual television contract with CBS, which is primarily being
paid for the televising of "March Madness," the Division I national basketball
tournament. In other words, even if the amount paid for such incentives grew
dramatically, to $25,000,000, the total expense anticipated would be only 10%
of the $250,000,000 increase in annual revenue generated by the new television
contract soon to be effective. Clearly, this "compensation" for student-athletes,
which is designed to result in the keeping of the educational covenant institutions have made with their athletes, is a pittance to pay to avoid the educational
and economic inequity prevalent in the current compensation scheme. Indeed,
the student-athletes may have a good argument for why they should be paid
more than a mere 5% of the total revenues under the television contract (or
merely 10% of the new revenues generated) which are attributable, in significant measure, to their athletic prowess.
Funding of the proposals in football is admittedly more problematic, primarily because there is no source of revenue comparable to the NCAA's new
television contract with CBS and the expenses are high.196 In terms of expense,
funding the grants-in-aid portion of our proposal is costly. For example, if the
114 Division I-A institutions197 increased overall graduation rates by 30%, they
would be entitled to 6 additional grants-in-aid, each of which would be valued
at an average of $15,000. The total cost, under those very optimistic calculations would exceed $10,000,000. 9 In turn, if stipends averaged $300 per
player and there were 91 players' 99 per squad, the total cost of stipends for the
AAA institutions in the NCAA (318) times 15 players per institution (currently, the NCAA
allows only 13 grants-in-aid per institution; we used the 15 figure in anticipation that institutions will increase their graduation rates and be entitled to more grants under my proposal)
times $300 in annual stipend per player (this figure represents an estimate of the average
amount of stipend that will be paid monthly to players and reflects the $300 that will be paid
to fourth year players). The total cost for twelve monthly payments to each qualifying athlete would be $17,172,000. A twelve-month payout is used, even though the academic year
is only 9-10 months long.
196 Today, the NCAA has little control over television revenues for football, either during the
regular season or the bowl season. The revenues flow directed to conferences and institutions, and the NCAA has little control over these funds. There was a time when the NCAA
exercised much more control over television revenues for football, but this came to an end
when the United States Supreme Court decided the case of NCAA v. Board of Regents of
University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 104 S.Ct. 2948 (1984), in which the Court held that
the NCAA's control of television broadcasting in football violated antitrust law.
197
We are only including Division I-A football, because Division I-AA has a separate championship, offers fewer scholarships, and does not generate the level of revenue produced by
Division I-A institutions and conferences.
198 Using the formula noted, the cost would be $10,260,000.
199 This figure is based on adding 6 grants-in-aid to the 85 grants currently allowable, for a
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114 Division I-A institutions would be in excess of $3,000,000." o The aggregate cost of our compensation proposals could ultimately be as high as
$13,000,000 for Division I-A men's football. While this number is comparable
to the cost of the proposals in Divisions I-A, I-AA and I-AAA men's basketball, there is currently no anticipated additional source from which those funds
could be generated.
If, however, the NCAA were to initiate a national championship game,
such a game could produce the revenues necessary to fund the proposal. The
Rose Bowl payout to the Big Ten, for example, reportedly exceeded
$1,400,000 for each school, for a total in excess of $15,000,000 to the Big Ten
alone. 201 That payout is at a level which makes it practical to anticipate that the
media would be willing to pay as much as $30,000,000, for the right to televise
a NCAA Division I-A sanctioned national championship on an annual basis.
Yet, there may be some opposition to this move on the part of institutions and
conferences that currently rely heavily on the funds currently generated from
the various bowl games. However, our proposal would not necessarily diminish that source of revenue. If the national championship pitted the winners of
two of the current major bowls against each other, that enthusiasm and concomitant revenue would be maintained for the major bowl games. Indeed, it is
possible that enthusiasm might be heightened because four schools would be
playing for the right to play for a legitimate national championship. Lesser
bowls, in turn, would no doubt maintain the same attraction they have today.
Thus, it is unlikely that institutions and conferences would lose revenues. Indeed, institutions that increased or maintained high graduation rates, throughout
Division I-A, would receive additional dollars for grants-in-aid.
Major conferences and institutions might oppose this proposal for another
reason. Currently, leading football conferences and institutions effectively control the televising of Division I-A football during the regular and bowl seasons.
They may simply oppose any intrusion by the NCAA, as a whole, on their prerogative and power. We hope, however, that they will not permit petty turf differences to stand in the way of a source that could fund proposals dealing directly with economic and educational deficiencies in the current system.
The remaining concern we might anticipate, in response to our national
championship recommendation, deals with objections to players participating
in an additional game. Since the benefits of that additional game will flow directly to the players themselves, in the form of academic and economic benefits, those arguments would seem to be more than counter-balanced by the
benefit to be received. This would be less true, of course, if the funds were
simply funneled to the conferences and institutions and not the players, as is
done under the current bowl system.
total of 91.
200

201

Using the formula, the cost would be $3,112,200.
Martha Brill, No Matter What Size, Money Drives Bowls,

<http://www.espn.go.com/ncf.news/991203/00210397.html>.
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In addition to funding concerns, our proposals raise significant Title IX or
gender equity concerns. If the additional dollars required to fund our grants-inaid and stipend proposals for revenue-producing sports, largely Division I
men's basketball and Division I-A men's football, must also be provided to
other nonrevenue-producing men's and women's programs, it is unlikely that
the funding necessary would be forthcoming. If women's programs do not receive similar funds, however, cries of gender inequity and violation of Title IX
will surely be heard.
To date, most of the effort to achieve gender equity in intercollegiate athletics under Title IX has focused on participation issues -- insuring that women
are able to participate in intercollegiate athletics in numbers proportional to
men. 20 2 Professor B. Glenn George recently noted, however, that:
After more than twenty-five years of enforcement (or lack thereof), Title IX has finally evolved into a second phase of interpretation. Although Title IX has had a
dramatic impact on the opportunities for women in intercollegiate athletics,
particularly in the last decade, most of the attention until recently was focused on
participation numbers. That battle has been largely won, at least in the courts, if
not on the field. More recent attention has now turned to a new issue - the
equitable allocation of scholarship dollars. This second wave of Title IX
enforcement is well on its way and has already altered the manner
0 3 in which many
institutions are counting and directing their scholarship budgets.
Professor George points out that the shift from issues of participation to
this second wave of Title IX enforcement, focusing the allocation of funds in
the form of grants-in-aid, began in earnest in 1997, when the National
Women's Law Center "filed a complaint with the OCR [Office of Civil Rights
of the Justice Department, the governmental entity largely charged with enforcing Title IX in this context] against twenty-five institutions alleging Title IX
violations based on a smaller proportion of financial aid going to women athletes. ' 2° 4 Professor George acknowledges that Division I programs with men's
football teams present special problems because they are permitted to use 85
grants-in-aid for their football teams, a number that is exceedingly difficult to
counter-balance, under current NCAA rules, with its limitations on grants-inaid permitted to women's teams at the Division I level. 205 Even though these
efforts to achieve economic equity in terms of grants-in-aid dollars are of recent
origin, institutions that are trying to achieve such equity are struggling to find
the dollars necessary to fund 20the
new grants and to provide enough women's
6
sports to achieve this balance.
Our proposal would potentially increase the number of grants in men's
football and basketball, thereby exacerbating the existing imbalance in funding
See, B. Glenn George, Title IX and the Scholarship Dilemma, 9
275-278.
202

Id. at 273.
278.
205 Id. at 278-79.
203

204 Id. at
206 Id.

MARQ. SPORTS

L.J. 273,
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between men's and women's grants-in-aid. Indeed, Professor George draws
attention to a proposal that would "decrease the number of football scholarships
(from eighty-five to seventy-five), while increasing the number of scholarships
for some women's sports. '2° 7 This new wave of efforts to equalize grants-inaid, therefore, would seem to be the death knell for our proposal.
However, this may not be the case. In Smith v. National CollegiateAthletic Association,20 8 the Supreme Court recently held that the NCAA is not subject to the requirements of Title IX on the ground that it receives dues from its
members which receive federal financial assistance. 20 9 This holding is less
expansive than it would appear to be at first blush. Public, and perhaps even
some private, institutions in the NCAA are subject to the strictures of Title IX,
including any decisions that may be rendered in terms of equity in grants-in-aid
dollars provided to men and women student-athletes. Thus, in effect, all the
Smith decision does is insulate the NCAA by requiring that plaintiffs bring actions against individual institutions rather than seeking association-wide relief.
There is another legal defense that may be available to the NCAA. If it
recognizes that it is compensating its athletes in revenue-producing sports at a
different level than athletes in nonrevenue-producing sports, it could argue that
Title IX does not apply. In this regard, there are two senses in which the economic equity requirements of Title IX might not apply to our proposals and
revenue-producing sports generally: 1) Since the revenue-producing requirement is, on its face, gender neutral - women's sports that are revenueproducing could be included under our proposal at limited cost, if the critical
criterion is revenue production and not gender (i.e., the regulation is genderneutral and is not a pretext for disadvantaging women) -- Title IX would not
apply; 210 and 2) Even if Title IX did apply generally, this is really an equal pay
for equal work claim, like that of women coaches who have challenged the differential in compensation between themselves and coaches in men's sports.
If plaintiffs are unable to obtain relief under Title IX, they would be required to seek equity in grants-in-aid and related economic support under the
Equal Pay Act of 1963.211 If they could establish unequal pay, they would not
be left without any recourse. This would seem to be the more appropriate legal
207 Id. at 282.
208 525 U.S. 459, 119 S. Ct. 924 (1999).
209
Id.
at 462.

A far more questionable yet somewhat related claim might be made. It could be contended that women are permitted to participate in big-time men's football and basketball, but
simply have not yet demonstrated the talent necessary to play at the highly competitive level.
They have rather created a separate athletic system, that is the sole enclave of women.
Women are, nevertheless, permitted to play men's sports. This is not even a "separate but
equal" system, since women may play on the men's team, but not vice versa. We do not
support such a claim, because it has a potential, if accepted, to set back some of the momentous strides that have been made to increase athletic opportunities for women.
2' 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that a plaintiff must prove that an employer is paying different wages to employees of the opposite sex for equal work.
210
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doctrine, because the issue is really one of equal pay for equal work. The Act
would require that the plaintiff establish that she is receiving "different wages.
. . for equal work." Women coaches have had difficulty establishing that they
are engaged in "equal work," when compared to male coaches in revenueproducing sports. For example, in Stanley v. University of Southern California,2 12 the court held that Coach Stanley (the women's basketball coach) failed
to offer proof that contradicted the evidence proffered by the University, which
demonstrated that Coach Raveling (the men's basketball coach) had different
responsibilities. The court elaborated on its holding:
Coach Raveling's responsibilities as head coach of the men's basketball team require substantial public relations and promotional activities to generate revenue for
USC. These efforts resulted in revenue that is 90 times greater than the revenue
generated by the women's basketball team. Coach Raveling was required to conduct twelve outside speaking engagements per year, to be accessible to the media
for interviews, and to participate in certain activities designed to produce donations
and endorsements for the USC Athletic Department in general. Coach Stanley's
position as head coach did not require her to engage in the same intense level of
promotional and revenue-raisingactivities. This quantitative dissimilarity in responsibilities justifies a different level of pay for the head coach of the womenDs
basketball team.213
The distinctions between men and women coaches in Division I basketball,
particularly in terms of revenue-production and media attention, would carry
over to student-athletes in men's and women's basketball at that level as well.
At the time when revenue production became similar, of course, equal pay
would be due, but that is certainly not the case in the vast majority of men's
and women's basketball programs at the Division I level. Men's and women's
basketball at the Division I level generally occupy very different niches in the
market, and those differences should be relevant in compensating studentathletes.
If these legal distinctions based on revenue production do not save our
grants-in-aid and stipends proposals from gender equity objections, the NCAA
could seek a limited or conditional legislative exemption from the strictures of
Title IX. When Title IX was adopted, the NCAA and many of its member institutions endeavored to lobby Congress to obtain an exemption, particularly
for men's football, from Title IX. 2 14 While this exemption effort has been unsuccessful in the past, 2 15 there are strong arguments in support of recognizing at
least a conditional exemption.
To begin with, the situation is much different today, in terms of equity for
women than it was at the time when such an exemption was originally sought.
13 F.3d 1313 (9k" Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1321 (emphasis added).
214 Deborah Brake and Elizabeth Catline, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW &
212
213

POLIcY
51 (1996) (citing S. 1539, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. Section 536 (1974)).
2 15
1d.
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Much progress has been made in terms of gender equity in intercollegiate athletics and steps have been taken to solidify those gains. Indeed, those very
strides have largely been funded at the Division I level by men's basketball and
football, the revenue-producing sports. If the economic pressure from gender
equity claims places undue economic demands on the current system, efforts to
dismantle intercollegiate athletics may gain momentum, harming female as
well as male athletes.
Racial equity claims also counter-balance gender equity claims in this area.
This article has focused in some measure on economic and educational inequities suffered by student-athletes in Division I men's basketball and football.2 16
The current system of gender equity itself raises some internal questions regarding racial equity for women athletes of color:
African-American women athletes, like their male counterparts, largely have not
gained access to all intercollegiate women's sports and are concentrated in two
sports: basketball and track. This possible lack of access to other sports (e.g., tennis, golf, swimming) on the part of male and female athletes of color is significant.
Donna Lopiano notes that 81 percent of African-American women athletes at the
intercollegiate level participate in track or basketball, and concludes that, "[t]he
race question - How do you get minority athletes the opportunities to participate in
all sports? - is just as important as the gender question." These disparities imply
serious inequities."'
Adding additional women's sports, in which women athletes of color have
not historically participated perhaps for the simple reason that they may lack
the resources to have participated in those sports when younger, only compounds problems of racial inequity. Sadly, those advocating the addition of
women's sports do not deal directly with racial inequities, for male and female
athletes of color, that should be addressed in determining whether to add additional sports and which sports should be added. When exemption arguments
were made in the past, these concerns were not raised. Today, they undoubtedly would be, and their existence might temper some of the enthusiasm for
gender equity in the form of providing funds for an equal number of grants and
stipends for women athletes in nonrevenue-producing programs.
Finally, the same market arguments raised in an equal pay case could be reiterated before Congress by those seeking an exemption. They could seek an
exemption for the limited purpose of insuring that dollars generated by revenue-producing sports receive some protection, particularly in light of the academic and economic needs of many of the male athletes potentially protected
by the exemption. If the exemption were designed to offer a modicum of protection to student-athletes in the revenue-producing sports, the exemption
would also protect women's sports that produce revenue, now or in the future.
They would be treated equally. As such, it would, at least on its face, be gender-neutral.
216

217

See discussion of this racial inequity supra notes 17-43. See also Smith, supra note 9.
Smith, supra note 9, at 350.
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If the NCAA were to seek such a limited exemption for revenue-producing
sports, we also recommend that the exemption be conditioned on the individual
members of the NCAA meeting their obligation to educate and, ultimately,
graduate the student-athletes involved in generating those revenues. It could,
for example, require institutions to graduate their student-athletes in the revenue-producing sports at a certain level (e.g., 50% in basketball or at a rate equal
to the graduation rate of the general student body), in order to be able to assert
the exemption from the strictures of Title IX. In other words, in order to assert
an exemption in a review by the Office of Civil Rights, the institution would
have to prove that it was graduating its student-athletes in revenue-producing
sports at that given level. If they failed to meet the graduation requirement,
they would be precluded from asserting the Title IX exemption. Such a conditional exemption, tied to graduation rates, has the added benefit of addressing
both issues of academic and educational inequity that have been discussed
throughout this article. Clearly, such a conditional limitation would put pressure on institutions (presidents, coaches and athletic administrators) that are not
meeting their educational obligations to student-athletes in revenue-producing
sports.
As was the case with Professor Gopelrud's stipend recommendation, our
stipend will raise some legal issues. Stipends will be taxable as income to
qualifying student-athletes, because that is what they are. Additionally, where
compensation in the form of grants or stipends is received, such compensation
may support arguments that these student-athletes are due worker's compensation. While it might be argued that the appropriate payment is a continuation of
the scholarship, for such purposes, even if institutions are held responsible under workers compensation law, the cost will hardly be prohibitive, and they can
be covered like other part-time employees at the institution. There may be
other legal problems related to a formal recognition of compensation for student-athletes, but the institutions are already doing so much that it is undoubtedly just a matter of time until such legal requirements are enforced against
them. Institutions, of course, may also seek exemptions from such laws.
In short, our proposals are viable. If the membership of Division I in the
NCAA is serious about addressing academic values and economic inequities,
we have provided them with the means of doing so, a means intended to build
practically and reasonably upon existing economic, structural and educational
issues of concern to the membership of the NCAA.
V. CONCLUSION

By focusing on balancing academic values and economic equity with a realistic recognition that "big-time" revenue-producing sports, particularly men's
basketball and football, are here to stay, we have developed a model that could
do much to deal with problems of economic inequity and the apparent slippage
in educational values plaguing such athletics. While our proposals recognize
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the reality of the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics, 218at least insofar as revenue-producing sports are concerned, they are also designed to deal
directly with claims of educational and economic inequity that have been raised
by student-athletes and proponents of a professionalization of "big-time" intercollegiate athletics. We have also dealt with major problems - funding and Title IX - that might render our proposals impractical or unlawful. None of those
problems, however, proved fatal. Thus, while we acknowledge that our proposals may need refinement, they do provide the basis of a game plan that
could lead to success on the playing field and in the classroom. The only question remaining is whether the membership of the NCAA has the will to do what
they already know to be right, to ensure that academic values and economic equity prevail in the operation of "big-time," revenue-producing intercollegiate
athletics.

As noted on pages 30-33, recognizing this need for further compensation of studentathletes in revenue-producing sports may leave little vitality in the pure amateurism value at
that level. Indeed, as Sack and Staurowsky so ably document, there is little left of the amateurism value at this level of competition anyway.
218
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Total Cost of Attendance

Biq Ten
Illinois
non-resident
Indiana
non-resident
Iowa
non-resident
Michigan
non-resident

Tuition & Books &
Fees Supe

Room &
Board

$740

$5,844

$11,604

$740

$5,844

$19,052

$5,020
$12,468
U

$4,652
$13,360
$3,204
$10,966
U

$6,526
$20,356
$5,043
$12,446

$4,649
$12,790
$24,648
$24,648

Penn State
non-resident
Purdue
non-resident
Wisconsin
non-resident
Total
non-resident

$692

$5,492

$19,544

$840
$840
$700
$700

$4 594

$8,638

$4,594

$16,400

$12,087

$2,060

$13,664

$2,060

$21,112

$2,240
$2,260

$13,076
$22,164

$3,120

$11,758

$3,120

$19,520

$1,944

$14,980

$1,944

$28,810

$1,437

$11,494

$1,437

$18,897

$2,193

$12,241

$2,193

$20,382

$1,380
$1,380

$34,476
$34,476

$2,598

$12,901

$2,598

$20,851

U

$5,810
$5,810

$13,036
$26,866
U

$716

$4,298

$10,057

$716

$4,298

$17,460
U

$729

$4,670

$10,048

$729

$4,670

$18,189
U

$1,128

$7,320

$33,096

$1,128

$7,320

$33,096

U

$4,137

U

Total

U

U

non-resident

non-resident

$10,836

U

Northwestern

Ohio State

$5,492

U

non-resident

non-resident

$692
U

Michigan St.

Minnesota

Total Personal
Expenses

U

$720

$5,446

$10,303

$720

$5,446

$18,253

U

U

$6,436

$656

$4,698

$11,790

$2,394

$14,184

$13,542

$656

$4,698

$18,896

$2,394

$21,290

$1,390

$11,612

$1,470

$20,724

$1,890

$11,450
$20,200

U

$750
$750

$3,650

$660

$5,600
$5 600
$5,250

$12,400

$660

$5,250

$3,872
$12,904

U

$10,222

$18,310

$19,254
U

$9,560

$1,890

U

$71,836 $8,331 $59,022 $139,190
$157,967 $8,331 $59,022 $225,320

$22,646 $161,836
$23,106 $248,426
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Tuition &

SEC

Fees

Books &

suwlne

Room &

Total

Personal

Total

Board

$2,872
$7,722
$3,707

$700
$700
$800

$4,324
$4,324
$4,453

$7,896
$12,746
$8,960

$3,254
$3,588
$2,200

$11,150
$16,334
$11,160

$8,691
$2,976

$800
$900

$4,453
$5,187

$13,944
$9,063

$2,200
$2,190

$16,144
$11,253

$8,766
$3,230

$900
$700

$5,187
$5,040

$14,853
$8,970

$2,302
$1,590

$17,155
$10,560

non-resident
Georgia

$10,220
$3,276

$700
$610

$5,040
$5,770

$15,960
$9,656

$1,590
$1,824

$17,550
$11,480

non-resident

$10,794
$3,446

$610
$600

$5,770
$3,722

$17,174
$7,768

$1,824
$2,190

$18,998
$9,958

$9,666
$2,711

$600
$668

$3,722
$3,772

$13,988
$7,151

$2,302
$1,778

$16,290
$8,929

Mississippi

$6,311
$3,054

$668
$750

$3,772
$5,060

$10,751
$8,864

$2,446
$2,000

$13,197
$10,864

non-resident

$7,006

$750

$5,060

$12,816

$2,000

$14,816

Mississippi St.

$3,017

$600

$5,135

$8,752

$1,799

$10,551

non-resident

$6,965

$600

$5,135

$12,700

$1,799

$14,499

South Caroina

$3,358

$600

$3,940

$7,898

$2,190

$10,088

non-resident

$7,884

$600

$3,940

$12,424

$2,302

$14,726

$3,234

$1,028

$4,214

$8,476

$4,152

$12,628

$9,534

$1,028

$4,214

$14,776

$4,152

$18,928

$24,711

$870

$8,324

$33,905

$1,120

$35,025

$24,711

$870

$8,324

$33,905

$1,120

$35,025

Alatama
non-resident

Arkansas
non-resident

Auburn
non-resident

Florida

Kentucky
non-resident

LSU
non-resident

Tennessee

non-resident

Vanderbilt
non-resident

Total
non-resident

$56,842

$8,826 $58,941 $124,609

$26,287 $150,896

$118,270

$8,826 $58,941 $186,037

$27,625 $213,662
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Table 2. Average Cost of Attendancefor One Year
Biq Ten

Tuition & Books & Room &
Fip -, simplip

Average
non-resident

$6,530
$14,360

SEC

Tuition & Books & Room &
Fees Supplies
Board

Average
non-resident

$4,737
$9,856

$757
$757

$736
..$736

Total

Personal

Total

Bnnrd

$5,365 $12,653
$5,365 $20,483
Total

$4,912 $10,385
$4,912 $15,504

$2,058 $14,712
$2,100 $22,584
Personal
Expenses

Total

$2,191 $12,576
$2,302 $17,806

Table 3. Total Cost of Attendance to Graduate- Includes an Estimated
Annual Increase in Costs

Big Ten
Illinois
non-resident
Indiana
non-resident
Iowa
non-resident
Michigan
non-resident
Michigan St.
non-resident
Minnesota
non-resident
Northwestern
non-resident
Ohio State
non-resident
Penn State
non-resident
Purdue
non-resident
Wisconsin
non-resident

Gradua te in 4
years
58,892
91,996
56,359
95,530
50,678
34,134
$i34,565
$1
$i?4,177
t9,541
31,449
52,761
37,849
18,596
$12
18,596
55,604
39,872
31,135
91,765
50,051
B9,322
19,352
B7,066

Graduate in Graduate in6
years
5 years
$75,500
$92,938
$118,183
$145,679
$72,253
$88,942
$122,471
$150,759
$64,970
$79,977
$107,861
$132,774
$82,773
$101,891
$159,197
$195,968
$63,511
$78,181
$104,419
$128 537
$67,641
$83,265
$112,624
$138,638
$190,502
$234,503
$190,502
$234,503
$71,285
$87,750
$115,217
$141,829
$78,376
$96,479
$117,644
$144,817
$64,166
$78,987
$114,512
$140,961
$63,270
$77,884
$111,620
$137,402
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SEC
Alabama
non-resident

Graduate in 4 Graduate in Graduate in
6 year
5 years
years I
$75,843
$61,612
$48,059
$111,104
$90,257
$70,403

Arkansas
non-resident

$48,101
$69,583

$61,666
$89,206

$75,909
$109,810

Auburn
non-resident

$48,503
$73,942

$76,543
$116,691

Florida
non-resident

$45,514
$75,643

$62,181
$94,795
$58,349
$96,975

Georgia
non-resident

$49,481
$81,883

$63,435
$104,975

$78,087
$129,222

Kentucky
non-resident

$42,921
$70,213

$55,025
$90,014

$67,734
$110,805

LSU
non-resident

$38,484
$56,881

$49,337
$72,922

$60,733
$89,765

Mississippi

$46,824

$60,029

$73,894

non-resident

$63 860

$81,870

$100,780

Mississippi St.

$45,478

$58,304

$71,771

non-resident

$62,492

$80,115

$98,619

South Carolina

$43,480

$55,742

$68,617

non-resident

$63,470

$81,369

$100,163

Tennessee
non-resident

$54,427

$69,776

$85,892

$81,581

$104,588

$128,745

$150,962

$193,535

$238,237

$150,962

$193,535

$238,237

Vanderbilt
non-resident

$71,826
$119,374
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Table 4. Average Total Cost of Attendance to Graduate- Includes an
Estimated 5% Annual Increase in Costs
28%
Graduate
in 4 Years
or Less

61%
Graduate
in 5 Years
or Less

39%
Graduate
in 6 Years
or More

Graduate
in 4 years
$63,412

Graduate
in 6 years
$100,072
$153,806

non-resident

$97,432

Graduate
in 5 years
$81,295
$124,932

Average not
including
Northwestern
resident

$54,894

$70,374

$86,629

non-resident

$92,316

$118,375

$145,736

Graduate
in 4 years
$55,186

Graduate
in 5 years
$70,749

Graduate
in 6 years
$87,091

non-resident

$76,743

$98,385

Average not
including
Vanderbilt
resident

$46,479

$59,587

$73,350

non-resident

$69,996

$89,735

$110,462

Big Ten
Average

SEC
Average

$121,110

